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Abstract
The domain name system (DNS) is one of the most important components of today’s Internet, and is the standard naming
convention between human-readable domain names and machine-routable IP addresses of Internet resources. However, due to
the vulnerability of DNS to various threats, its security and functionality have been continuously challenged over the course of
time. Although, researchers have addressed various aspects of the DNS in the literature, there are still many challenges yet to
be addressed. In order to comprehensively understand the root causes of the vulnerabilities of DNS, it is mandatory to review the
various activities in the research community on DNS landscape. To this end, this paper surveys more than 170 peer reviewed papers,
which are published in both top conferences and journals in last ten years, and summarizes vulnerabilities in DNS and corresponding
countermeasures. This paper not only focuses on the DNS threat landscape and existing challenges, but also discusses the utilized
data analysis methods, which are frequently used to address DNS threat vulnerabilities. Furthermore, we looked into the DNS
threat landscape from the view point of the involved entities in the DNS infrastructure in an attempt to point out more vulnerable
entities in the system.
1. Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) is one of the pillars of
the operation of the Internet, the medium on which most of
communications are today transported. Among other purposes,
DNS is used today widely for domain names to translate them
into Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. The domain name system
maps a name that people use to locate a website to the IP ad-
dress that a computer uses to locate that website. For example,
if a user types www.example.com into a web browser, a server
behind the scenes will map that name to an IP address, e.g.,
1.2.3.4, corresponding to that domain. Web browsing and most
other Internet activities, e.g., transferring files, rely on DNS to
quickly provide the information necessary to connect users to
remote hosts. DNS mapping is distributed throughout the Inter-
net in a hierarchy of authorities.
Based on the key role of the DNS in networking infrastruc-
ture, attackers are aggressively looking for new ways to com-
promise the DNS infrastructure. Therefore, it is necessary to
understand the evolution of DNS security and the associated is-
sues to preserve reliable and secure services, and to improve the
security of DNS through various iterations of design revisions.
Indeed, recently, researchers from academia and industry have
focused on improving the design of DNS by allowing various
necessary options, and by revising its assumptions of opera-
tion. However, the constant evolution of DNS, as well as the
rise of new detrimental and unconventional issues, such as per-
vasive adversaries, privacy risks, and new and advanced forms
of attacks, make the functionality, security, and privacy of DNS
important issues that require continued attention and investiga-
tion. To this end, surveying, summarizing, and categorizing the
body of work on DNS security and privacy is an important en-
deavor that is lacking in the existing literature. This effort is
necessary to guide the community to what is an open problem
that requires further attention.
Particularly, despite the large number of works in the liter-
ature on DNS security and privacy, existing contributions are
scattered across different research areas and a comprehensive
yet concise survey is lacking. Although there exist several sur-
veys in the field of DNS [1, 2, 3, 4, 5], they are limited from
several points of view. First, the scope of those works is nar-
row, e.g., covering only a certain aspect of the DNS ecosystem,
such as detecting Internet abuse by analyzing passive DNS traf-
fic [3], malicious domain detection through DNS data analy-
sis [4], and investigating the domain name squatting ecosys-
tem [5]. Second, the number of studies covered in each of those
prior works—even on the very well accepted set of problems in
the field of DNS security and privacy—is limited, and does not
cover the most recent advances, which require further attention
and consideration—especially in an evolving domain [1, 5].
To this end, this survey fills the gap in the literature by
putting together an up-to-date summary of research works that
cover various aspects of the DNS ecosystem and associated se-
curity and privacy issues—and all in one place. Toward this
goal, we have surveyed a wide range of research works from
various points of view, including the DNS threat landscape,
DNS research methods, and DNS research scopes.
The general outline of the survey, highlighting the road map
towards the key terms and directions, is shown in Figure 1. In
the following we briefly review some of those broad directions.
1.1. DNS Threat Landscape
A central component of this work is DNS threat landscape.
By reviewing the threats, we primarily focus on the common
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Figure 1: The general outline of the survey. We have surveyed a wide variety of research works from various points of view, including DNS threat landscape, DNS
research methods, and DNS research scops.
challenges in security and privacy of DNS infrastructure. Such
threats may not only compromise the security and privacy of
end-users, but may also undermine the performance and avail-
ability of Internet services that heavily rely on DNS for their
operation. We demonstrate such an interdependence through
various practical and challenging attacks and efforts in the liter-
ature to defend against them. For example, attackers abuse the
functionality of open DNS resolvers to transfer a small number
of DNS queries into significantly large payload coordinated at a
target server or network, thus making the server inaccessible, in
what is known as amplification attacks. Despite the large body
of research works on detection and mitigation of DNS amplifi-
cation attacks [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14], such attacks still
compromise today’s Internet, according to Nexusguard’s 2018
threat report of Q1 [15].
Another example we highlight is cache poisoning; DNS re-
solver cache can be compromised through the insertion of unau-
thorized domain names and IP addresses in order to redirect
users to malicious IP addresses. Consequently, by launching
this attack an adversary can compromise the performance of
Internet services and distribute malicious contents, such as mal-
ware, spam, credentials theft, phishing contents, among many
others. There exist several research works that attempted to ad-
dress DNS cache poisoning attacks [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]
using different methods, such as DNSSEC [23, 16], WSEC
DNS [19], ECO-DNS [18], and Anax [17], among others, which
we outline this study.
Attackers also utilize botnets that allow them to access de-
vices through propagation and coordinate among them using
C&C channels to perform wide variety of malicious activities,
such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack [24], am-
plification attacks, and credentials stealing, among many oth-
ers [25]. DNS plays an essential role in the operation of botnets
by providing easily deploy-able C&C channel. Although vari-
ous research works have studied botnets and possible solutions
to defend against their attacks [26, 27, 12, 28, 29], including
marginalizing DNS infrastructure used for this attack. How-
ever, such attacks are still on the rise, compromising users’
security. Specifically, the emergence and rise of IoT and as-
sociated vulnerabilities opened new directions, whereby attack
vectors facilitated by DNS’ reliability and deployment played a
crucial role in those attacks. For example, the Mirai botnet at-
tacks IoT devices, such as routers and video recorders [30, 31],
and uses them for amplification attacks, necessitating security
solutions optimized for IoT and its interplay with DNS [32, 33].
DNS manipulation may expose users to multiple threats,
such as phishing and malicious domains. Accordingly, a large
number of studies considered DNS manipulation [34, 35, 36,
37, 38], and its interplay with the detection and mitigation of
phishing attacks [39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44]. Despite this large
number of studies, phishing and associated DNS manipulation
is still a challenging and expanding area. Phishers are targeting
mobile messaging and social apps at an increasing rate [45],
highlighting the need for further investigation and defenses.
A large body of research has been devoted to the detec-
tion of malicious domain names [46, 47, 39, 48, 49, 50, 51,
52, 53, 26, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58], which can be classified into
two general categories: classification based [46, 47, 39, 48, 26]
and inference based [54, 51, 55, 58] methods. Classification-
based methods rely on local network and host information. The
inference-based methods exploit global information along with
local information of domains.
Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) are utilized to in-
termittently produce a large number of domain names for ma-
licious purposes. There exist several research works that ex-
plored the ecosystem of DGAs [59, 60, 61, 28, 12, 62].
Furthermore, another type of threat is domain name squat-
ting, where cybersquatters register variants of popular trade-
mark names through different squatting strategies, has been con-
sidered. Such attacks include various variants, i.e. typosquat-
ting [63, 64, 5, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69], bitsquatting [70, 71, 72],
combosquatting [41], and soundsquatting [73]. Domain name
squatting becomes popular as an attack vector to start many
other types of attacks [66, 65]. Related to this is domain mone-
tization through parking; despite technically being a legitimate
business, parked domain monetization can often lead to and get
mixed with other practices, i.e. click fraud, as well as traffic
spam and traffic stealing—which usually lead to serving mali-
cious content i.e. malware and spam [74, 66, 75, 76]. All of
these threats may compromise the security and privacy of DNS
landscape and users. There are large amount of research regard-
ing privacy leakage and various solutions have been proposed,
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such as EncDNS [77], PPDNS [78], DLV [79], etc. However,
DNS Research Methods. Another vertical of our survey is the
DNS research methods used in the literature, and their associ-
ated work. In exploring the DNS research methods, we have
investigated various data analysis methods, which have been
utilized to detect, model, and mitigate the aforementioned DNS
threats. First, we describe two main DNS data collection meth-
ods utilized in the literature and the associated works, including
passive DNS data (PDNS) [80, 47, 81, 82, 83, 12, 11, 84, 48,
41, 67, 22, 51] and Active DNS data (ADNS) [67, 83, 85, 54,
41, 86]. Next, we categorize the research works based on the
common DNS data analysis techniques that have been used in
the literature, such as machine learning algorithms [80, 17, 46,
53, 22, 54, 55, 56, 87, 88, 89, 76] and association analysis [59,
82, 90, 54, 91]. Finally, we categorize the research works based
on their scope of analysis and from security point of view into
vanilla DNS [35, 40, 29, 92, 93, 94, 18] and DNSSEC [95, 96,
97, 86, 98, 99, 23, 9, 100].
1.2. DNS Entities Scopes
We categorize the literature based on the entities they tar-
get, including DNS name servers, open DNS resolvers, hosting
providers, and clients. Such categorization would reveal the
most susceptible entity and its impact on the performance and
security of whole DNS ecosystem. For example, open DNS re-
solvers can be exploited to conduct multiple attacks on behalf
of attackers [101, 17, 7, 51, 77, 36, 23, 37, 19, 93, 35, 13].
We discuss advantages and disadvantages of the proposed
countermeasures at the end of each section and highlighted the
existing open problems. We list the abbreviations used through-
out this paper in Table 1. Finally, the key characteristics of
our survey in this paper can be summarized as: 1. we conduct
a comprehensive survey mainly focusing on recent major ad-
vances in the area of DNS security and privacy. The focuses
of the survey are the threat landscape, research methods, and
research scopes (based on a classification of the DNS system
model). 2. The scope of the survey is defined in such a way that
not only it focuses on the up-to-date challenges, by gathering
works mostly published in the past decade, but also by focus-
ing on the most critical and ongoing challenges corresponding
to the current trend. 3. We highlight the existing open chal-
lenges in the security and privacy of DNS infrastructure, which
requires further investigations by security specialists to be ad-
dressed. We use that as a summary in every surveyed area.
1.3. Organization
In section 2 we present an overview of DNS functionality
and DNS resolution. Major DNS threats and associated coun-
termeasures are presented in section 3. DNS research methods
are presented in section 4. In section 5 we explore research
work addressing the different entities in the DNS model. Fi-
nally, the paper is concluded in section 6.
2. Preliminaries
This section is devoted to provide an overview of how DNS
works, including the domain name resolution process.
2.1. Functionality
When a user wants to visit a website through the Internet he
does so by connecting to a domain name, such as www.example.com;
however, computers do not communicate with domain names,
but rather they are only able to communicate using addresses
represented as numbers, namely IP addresses. Therefore, the
domain name of the intended website should be converted to its
associated IP address. Addresses in the network can be repre-
sented either using IPv4 or IPv6. The first is composed of four
bytes and is represented using four number segments, such as
1.2.3.4, whereas IPv6 is four times larger and is composed of
eight segments, each of them is two bytes and represented by
hexadecimal numbers. In comparison to natural languages, rec-
ognizing and remembering numerical addresses of the intended
Internet services is not an easy task for users. Therefore, in
the early 1980’s Paul Mockapetris [102] introduced the basics
of the DNS, which enables users to automatically map human-
readable domain names into machine-readable addresses. DNS
is an essential component of the functionality of the Internet.
2.2. DNS Resolution
DNS is a hierarchical and globally distributed directory ser-
vice that utilizes root, TLD, and authoritative name servers in
order to resolve string addresses of the domains into IP ad-
dresses. The process of domain name resolution is shown in
Figure 2.The DNS resolution process begins once a user at-
tempts to access a web service using Internet web browser. In
the case where there is no information about the given domain
in the local cache and host table, the local resolver initiates a
DNS query to a recursive resolver seeking to match the domain
with its corresponding IP address. Then, the recursive resolver
starts asking the root, TLD, and then authoritative name servers,
and over steps 2© through 7©, to answer the query. The root
server is the first server that receives queries from recursive re-
solvers, in step 2©. The root servers are globally distributed
and maintain the IP addresses and location of authoritative TLD
name servers. In step 3©, the root name server replies to the
query with the appropriate list of authoritative TLD servers for
the .com TLD. In step 4©, the recursive server sends a query
for example.com to the .com TLD name server. Once the query
reaches the .com TLD name server, it responds with the IP ad-
dress of the domain’s authoritative name server, as shown in
step 5©. At the next step, namely step 6©, the recursive resolver
sends a query to the authoritative name server. The authoritative
name server knows the IP address for www.example.com and at
step 7© that answer is returned to the recursive name server. Fi-
nally, the determined IP address of the requested domain name
is forwarded to the local resolver and then to a web browser.
As a result, the browser can send a Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP) request to the website to retrieve its contents.
3. DNS Threat Landscape
The original implementation of the DNS did not include se-
curity and privacy protections; instead the original DNS was
built to be a scalable distributed system. As the Internet has
3
Table 1: List of abbreviations in alphabetical order.
Term Definition Term Definition
2LD Second Level Domain ML Machine Learning
3LD Third Level Domain MLP Multi Layer Perceptron
AP Affinity Propagation MS Mean Shift
BGP Border Gateway Protocol NAT Network Address Translation
C&C Command and Control NB Naive Bayes
CPM Convex Polytope Machine NN Neural Networks
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service RBC Rule-Based Classifier
DGA Domain Generation Algorithm RDNS Recursive Domain Name System
DNS Domain Name System RF Random Forest
DNSSEC DNS Security Extensions RR Resource Records
DoS Denial of Service RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
DT Decision Tree SDN Software Defined Networking
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol SL Simple Logistic
IoT Internet of Things SVM Support Vector Machine
IP Internet Protocol TCP Transmission Control Protocol
IPv4 Internet Protocol Version 4 TLD Top Level Domain
IPv6 Internet Protocol Version 6 TLS Transport Layer Security
ISP Internet Service Provider TSVM Transductive Support Vector Machine
KNN K-Nearest Neighbour TTL Time To Live
LAN Local Area Network UDP User Datagram Protocol
LWL Locally Weighted Learning URL Uniform Resource Locator
MITM Man in the Middle
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Figure 2: Illustration of DNS resolution over recursive, root, TLD, and author-
itative name server. Once a user attempts to access www.example.com (step
1©), in the case that there is no information about the given domain in the local
cache and host table, recursive resolver starts asking root, TLD, and authorita-
tive name servers and over steps 2© through 7© to answer the query.
grown, however, adversaries have found weaknesses that can
be abused for malicious purposes. There is a large body of re-
search in this area, which lead to identification of major threats
that substantially compromise the DNS security. In this section,
we would delve into the common threats in the DNS ecosystem
and state-of-the-art countermeasures presented in the literature.
Our effort in enumerating and categorizing the literature in
this domain is featured in the follow. We review the proposed
methods for detection and mitigation of popular threats of DNS
infrastructure, including amplification and DoS attacks (§3.1),
DNS cache poisoning attacks (§3.2), botnets attacks (§3.3), phish-
ing attacks (§3.4), DNS manipulation (§3.5), malicious domain
detection (§3.6), domain generation algorithms (§3.7), domain
name squatting (§3.8), parked domain monetization and associ-
ated security issues (§3.9), and privacy leakage (§3.10).
In addition, we will discuss challenges and highlight open
problems that require further investigations by security researchers
associated with each of those major problems. In Table 9 and Ta-
ble 10, topical classification of DNS threats in the literature is
addressed, with sample works presented as well.
3.1. Amplification and DoS Attacks
A DNS amplification attack is a reflection-based DDoS at-
tack. In DNS, an amplification attack is done by issuing a small
number of DNS queries that are later transformed into a con-
siderably large payload coordinated at the target network. The
high level architecture of a typical DNS amplification attack is
demonstrated in Figure 3. The attacker hides the exploit source
and directs the DNS response into the target address through
spoofing look-up requests issued to DNS servers. It is difficult
to defend against such an attack, since it originates from legiti-
mate servers with legitimate traffic.
A wide variety research works have been conducted to de-
tect and mitigate DNS amplification attacks [7, 9, 103, 104,
10, 13, 6, 11, 12, 8, 14]. For instance, Ballani et al. [7] have
presented a simple method based on caching behavior analysis
of DNS resolvers to defend against DNS DoS attacks. They
have stored cached records with TTL in a stale cache. Then,
the stale cache can be used by a resolver that does not receive
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Figure 3: High-level architecture of a typical DNS amplification attack. Small
number of DNS queries are being transformed into a significantly large payload
coordinated at the target network.
any response from the authoritative name servers.Herzberg et
al. [9] have designed an anti-reflection system, providing DNS
authentication, which nullifies the amplification factor of the
DNS responses abused for DoS attacks. DNS authentication
is composed of two subsystems, namely a request authentica-
tion that detects and filters requests sent from spoofed IP ad-
dresses, and resolver authentication that maintains a list of po-
tentially compromised hosts. They have deployed the resolver
authentication as a cloud-based service to further reduce costs
and provide additional defenses for DNS servers. Furthermore,
Rijswijk-Deij et al. [104] investigated the potential for abuse
in DNSSEC-signed domains in a large scale, covering 70% of
all signed domains in operation. Their analysis demonstrate
that DNSSEC in-fact empowers DNS amplification attacks for
a particular query type, ANY. In addition, Rossow [103] has
investigated Distributed Reflective Denial-of-Service (DRDoS)
attacks through revisiting well-known UDP-based protocols, in-
cluding network services, online games, file sharing networks,
and botnets to assess their security against DRDoS abuse. His
analysis revealed that attackers already started abusing 14 pro-
tocols through bandwidth amplification and multiplying the traf-
fic up to a factor 4670.
MacFarland et al. [10] examined a large number of do-
mains (≈129M) and authoritative servers (≈1.1M) to investi-
gate the inherent DNS amplification risks associated with DNS
authoritative name servers. Their analysis showed that only a
small number of authoritative servers (≈3.8%) are responsible
for the highest amplification factors. In addition, their analy-
sis revealed that adoption of DNS response rate limit is lim-
ited to less than ≈3% of authoritative servers. Finally, they
Table 2: Summary of representative work that studied DNS amplification at-
tacks; RL is Response Latency, ID is Input Data, and O(1,2,3) donates Other
disadvantages: (1)modification of standard DNS resolver semantics, (2)third-
party organizations, and (3)low detection accuracy.
Work Method Advantages Disadvantages
RL ID O(1,2,3)
[6] sFlow/SDN Near real-time detection 7
[7] Stale cache Simple, lightweight 7(1)
[8] One-to-one mapping Complete mitigation 7
[9] DNS authentication Cloud based service 7
[10] Tunnel/remote resolver Legacy compatible 7 7(2)
[12] ML/domain features Small feature space 7(3)
[13] DRS-ADAM Easy deployment 7
[14] RADAR Real-time detection 7
have suggested tunnelling into a remote resolver as a straight-
forward and simple countermeasure to mitigate on-going at-
tack at the organization level. Verma et al. [13] have utilized
the fact that DNS resolvers share the local DNS query rates
to propose an amplified DNS attack mitigation system called
Distributed Rate Sharing-based Amplified DNS-DDoS Attack
Mitigation (DRS-ADAM). The authors claim that DRS-ADAM
detects and completely stops an amplified DNS attack by im-
posing DNS query rate sharing among resolvers involved in an
attack. DRS-ADAM has several advantages; deployment, ro-
bustness against manipulation, and attack mitigation.
Aizuddin et al. [6] have incorporated sFlow with security-
centric SDN features to analyze DNS query identifiers (IDs) for
detecting and mitigating DNS amplification attack in a timely
manner. Their analysis showed that the proposed method pro-
vides accurate detection results (more than 97.0%) even with a
small number of flow values (DNS attributes). Kim et al. [8]
have presented a DNS amplification attack mitigation system
through a one-to-one strict mapping method between DNS re-
quests and responses in order to identify orphan DNS responses.
Their analysis showed that the proposed solution removes the
possibility of false positive packets. Zheng et al. [14] have pro-
posed Reinforcing Anti-DDoS Actions in Real-time (RADAR)
which detects various DDoS attacks, such as link flooding, SYN
flooding, and UDP-based amplification attacks. They do so
through adaptive correlation analysis on commercial off-the-
shelf SDN switches. RADAR does not require any changes
in the SDN protocols and switches deployed in the network to-
day, nor does it require additional appliances to detect attacks,
making it an easy-to-plug solution in today’s operations.
Truong et al. [12] analyzed DNS traffic to design a detec-
tion system for recognition of pseudo-random domain names,
including Conficker and Zeus, form legitimate domain names.
The proposed detection system is composed of two main sub-
systems, including feature extraction and classification. The
length of domain names and their expected values construct the
feature space and classification section is composed of several
classification algorithms, e.g., RF, KNN, SVM, and NB.
Discussion. Despite the large body of research work on the de-
tection and mitigation of DNS amplification and DoS attacks,
such attacks are still prevalent and compromising today’s Inter-
net. Table 2 summarizes the proposed methods in the literature
and their strengths and weaknesses. Shortcomings of the pro-
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Table 3: Summary of the some of representative research works that have in-
vestigated DNS cache poisoning attacks. Here LDR is Low Deployment Rate
of DNSSEC, AR is Acuracy Rate, and WSR donates
Work Method Advantages Disadvantages
LDR AR WSR
[16] DNSSEC A-posteriori detection 7
[17] Anax Easy deployment 7
[19] WSEC DNS Easy deployment 7
[23] DNSSEC Cryptographic/verifiable 7
posed methods, which would require further attention from the
community, can be summarized as: 1. increasing response la-
tency due to detection process, which requires light-weight and
latency sensitive detectors [9, 10, 6, 8]. 2. requiring a range of
changes to the DNS resolvers and semantics [7], which calls
for work that address legacy-compatibility or require very lit-
tle of such changes. 3. requiring large number of IP addresses
to be collected every day [11], or requiring large number of
flow rules [14], which calls for aggregate and light-weight fea-
ture engineering methods. 4. low detection accuracy, in some
cases [12], which calls for improving accuracy through multi–
modality of detection features.
3.2. DNS Cache Poisoning
The DNS resolver cache, or simply DNS cache, is a tempo-
rary database that stores resolved DNS look-ups. As a result,
this caching enables users to quickly resolve a previously vis-
ited website. Unfortunately, DNS cache can be compromised
through the insertion of unauthorized domain names and IP ad-
dresses. General flow of the DNS cache poisoning attack is
illustrated in Figure 4. In this manner, users’ queries might be
directed to a fake destination with malicious content or adver-
tisements. DNS cache poisoning compromises the correct op-
eration of Internet services and can be used for malicious activ-
ities, such as distributing malware and spam, phishing attacks,
credential theft, etc. To this end, several research works have
been conducted to detect and mitigate the DNS cache poison-
ing attacks [16, 17, 19, 20, 18, 21, 22].
Herzberg and Shulman [23] studied the security of the patched
DNS and found that not only source ports may be circumvented
by various NAT devices, but also IP address randomization of
standard-conforming resolvers can be circumvented. In addi-
tion, they demonstrated that DNS query randomization with
both random prefix and 0x20 encoding can be circumvented
easily. Finally, they suggested the deployment of DNSSEC as a
countermeasure to prevent DNS cache poisoning attacks. Fur-
thermore, Weaver et al. [34] have analyzed a large number of
measurement sessions from distinct IP addresses, collected by
Netalyzr [105], to understand the DNS behavior. Their analysis
revealed that DNS infrastructure suffers from significant lim-
itations, such as inefficient look-ups, unreliability of IP-level
fragmentation, and ISP-driven manipulation of DNS.
Shulman and Waidner [16] studied the security of DNS in-
frastructure and highlighted that although adoption of challenge-
response defenses [106, 107] are prevalent, DNS infrastruc-
ture is highly exposed to cache poisoning attacks. The authors
attacker
1© inject fake DNS entry
example.com IP:4.3.2.1
DNS cache resolver
3©
example.com
IP:4.3.2.1
2©
request for
www.example.com
BP
original
IP:1.2.3.4
malicious
4© IP:4.3.2.1
user
Figure 4: DNS cache poisoning attack. Attacker injects fake DNS entries into
the DNS cache resolvers in an attempt to direct users into fake destinations,
mainly for malicious purposes like phishing.
claimed that DNSSEC is a suitable solution to defend against
cache poisoning attacks. Antonakakis et al. [17] have stud-
ied open recursive DNS resolvers’ cache poisoning attacks and
have found that attackers generally point victims to rogue IP
addresses. Therefore, they have proposed Anax, a system that
examines the nature of cache poisoning attacks and automati-
cally detects them. Anax analyses resource records and extracts
a set of statistical features, such as domain name diversity, 2LD
diversity, 3LD diversity1, etc. Then, these features are fed into
a set of learning algorithms, such as SVM, neural network, etc.
for cache poisoning attack detection.
Perdisci et al. [19] proposed Wildcard SECure (WSEC) DNS
as a solution that defends against DNS cache poisoning attacks.
WSEC DNS incorporates wildcard domains with TXT resource
records to secure recursive DNS servers from cache poisoning
attacks. WSEC DNS can be easily deployed, since it does not
require any modifications of the root and TLD name servers.
Wu et al. [20] have proposed a DNS cache poisoning attack
detection system based on the Kalman filter technique. The
proposed system is composed of two subsystems: an entropy
sequence, which is modeled using state space equations, and
a second Kalman filter method, which is used to detect the at-
tacks. The effectiveness of the proposed system is illustrated for
both single and distributed cache poisoning attacks. The mea-
surement errors and the correlation variation of the prediction
errors are utilized for detection of the single and the distributed
cache poisoning attacks, respectively.
Chen et al. [21] have investigated the impact of disposable
domains on the caching behavior of the DNS resolvers. Their
analysis showed that as the prevalence of the disposable do-
mains increase, it is likely that the DNS cache begins to be
filled with resource records that are unlikely to be reused. In
addition, their analysis revealed that disposable domains not
only are widely used by different industries, such as Anti-Virus
1xLD refers to the x-th level domain. In http://www.example.com, exam-
ple.com is a 2nd level domain, and www.example.com is a 3rd level domain.
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Table 4: Summary of the research works that have investigated detection of bot-
net domains. Here AR is Accuracy Rate, while LDR donates Low Deployment
Rate of DNSSEC.
Work Method Advantages Disadvantages
AR LDR
[12] ML/domain length Small feature space 7
[27] DNSSEC Strict delegation 7
[27] ML/statistical features Simple 7
[29] Probability/DNS traffic Simple 7
companies, e.g., McAfee, Sophos, and popular websites, e.g.,
Microsoft, Google, social networks, e.g., Facebook, etc., but
also are increasing in that trend.
Similarly, Hao and Wang [22] have studied the negative im-
pact of one-time-use domain names on the performance of DNS
caching. Therefore, they proposed a one-time-use domain de-
tection system that incorporates syntactical features extracted
from domain name string, such as length of query name, length
of the longest sub-domain name, Sub-domain depth, etc. with
machine learning algorithms is proposed. The authors argue
that removal or even not inserting such resource records into
the cache can prevent from waste of the DNS cache resources.
Discussion. Different research works have proposed various
methods for detection and mitigation of DNS cache poisoning
attacks. These methods and their strengths and weaknesses are
summarized Table 3. The limitations of proposed solutions can
be summarized as:. 1. low deployment rate of DNSSEC [23,
16], which by design address cache poisoning, calling for fur-
ther exploration of how to creates incentives for the spread of
DNSSEC deployment. 2. low detection accuracy [17, 22], call-
ing for better accuracy using multiple types of features. 3. caus-
ing overheads on DNS traffic, memory usage and increasing re-
sponse latency [19], calling for lightweight and more efficient
approaches. 4. and wasting DNS cache storage resources by
prefetching unpopular resource records [18], which calls for
adaptive resolution.
3.3. Botnet and Attacks Using DNS
The word botnet is a combination of the words robot and
network, and refers into a number of Internet-connected de-
vices, each of which is running one or more bots. Botnets are
composed of various infected hosts, C&C channels, and a bot-
master. The general infrastructure of a botnet is shown in Fig-
ure 5. Botnets can be used to perform DDoS attack [24], pass-
word theft [25], and allow the attacker (botmaster) to access de-
vices and their connection through C&C channels. Researchers
have investigated the threat of botnets various works, including
the intersection between botnets and DNS [26, 27, 12, 28, 29].
Jiang et al. [27] have studied whether deleting malicious
domain names from upper level DNS servers can prevent bot-
net C&C and malware propagation. Their analysis showed that
ghost domain names stay resolvable even long after the del-
egated data has been removed from the domain registry and
the record’s TTL is expired. Finally, they suggest adoption of
DNSSEC to overcome the threat of ghost domain attack.
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Figure 5: An overview of a botnet infrastructure. Attacker (botmaster) remotely
abuses infected devices (zombies) and its connections through C2 channels for
malicious activities.
Jin et al. [26] have investigated the characteristics of the
DNS log of botnet domain resolution and extracted six differ-
ent features, e.g., number of source IPs, total querying per day,
and querying per hour, among others. These features are then
fed into three different classification algorithms, including Ad-
aboost, DT, and NB to detect botnet domain names. In addi-
tion, Chang et al. [108] have performed longitudinal study to
identify novel botmaster strategies through analyzing multiple
active botnet families.
Truong and Cheng [12] have studied DNS traffic to design
a detector that distinguishes domain names generated by legit-
imate users and pseudo-random domain names generated by
botnets, such as Conficker [109] and Zeus [110]. The proposed
detector classifies the domain names based on machine learning
algorithms, e.g., RF, KNN, SVM, and NB, and using extracted
features from DNS traffic, including length of domain names
and their expected values.
In addition, Xu et al. [29] have carried out a comprehensive
study to investigate the feasibility of DNS as a stealthy botnet
C&C channel. Therefore, they have tested various strategies,
e.g., piggybacking query strategy and exponentially distributed
query strategy, that can be utilized at the network level to effec-
tively hide malicious DNS activities. Finally, a countermeasure
is proposed that compares the probability distributions of legit-
imate DNS traffic and tunneling traffic.
Discussion. Although various research works have studied bot-
nets and possible solutions to defend against botnet attacks,
such attacks are still compromising users and systems security,
highlighting the limitations of the proposed methods. These
methods and their strengths and weaknesses are summarized
in Table 4. The shortcomings of the proposed methods can be
summarized as follows: Low detection accuracy [12, 27], high
false alarm rate [29], and low deployment rate of DNSSEC [27].
In addition, the emergence and rise of IoT and associated vul-
nerabilities opens a new research direction that requires further
investigations. For example, the Mirai botnet attacks insecure
IoT devices, e.g., routers and digital video recorders [30, 31]
highlighting the need for security solutions optimized for the
IoT devices [32, 33]
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Table 5: Summary of sample research works that have studied phishing attacks.
Here G is Generic, L is Lightweight, and AR donates Accuracy Rate. . The
common weakness of these studies is low detection accuracy.
Work Method Advantages Disadvantages
G L
[39] EXPOSURE 3 AR
[42] Phishwish 3 AR
[43] Visual similarity 3 AR
[44] Visual similarity 3 AR
3.4. Phishing Attacks and Defenses
Attackers in phishing attack, attempt to acquire personal
and secret information, such as passwords and details of credit
cards, by disguising as a trustworthy entity in an electronic
communication. In light of the MCSI review published on 2014,
the yearly overall effect of the phishing and different types of
data fraud attacks has been assessed at as high as US$5 billion
[111] only at one particular country, Singapore. Therefore, re-
searchers have conducted a large number of works to detect and
mitigate phishing attacks [39, 40, 41, 42, 43] .
For example, Bilge et al. [39] have presented a malicious
domain detection system, called EXPOSURE, which analyzes
various characteristics of DNS names and the way that they
are queried. EXPOSURE analyzes DNS traffic and extracts
different types of features, including time-based feature, DNS
answer-based features, TTL value-based features, and domain
name-based feature. Those features are then used by EXPO-
SURE to design a decision based classifier for automatic detec-
tion of a wide range of malicious domain names, e.g., botnet
C&C servers, phishing sites, and scam hosts.
Web-based approaches. Cook et al. [42] proposed a mech-
anism, Phishwish, to detect phishing messages or emails with
a small false positive rate. The idea of Phishwish was to pro-
vide better protection against zero-hour attacks than blacklists.
Phishwish analyzes text and HTML formatted emails using four
general rules: identification and analysis of the log-in URL in
the email, analysis of the email headers, analysis of the images
in the email, and analysis of the accessibility of the URLs.
Medvet et al. [43] presented a phishing detection method
based on the visual-similarity that works based on analyzing
three main characteristics of websites; the text pieces, the em-
bedded images in the page, and the overall visual appearance
of the website. A similarity signature is calculated for legiti-
mate and suspicious websites and an alarm is raised if the sig-
natures were too similar. Furthermore, Hara et al. [44] have
proposed a phishing detection technique based on visual sim-
ilarity that works even if the original website is not registered
in the database. A collection of legitimate websites are used
to train the classifier and store in a database. A suspected web-
site’s snapshot is then compared to the websites in the database;
the suspected website is labeled as phishing if the image simi-
larity metric is above a certain threshold. In case where there
is no similar website in the database the suspected website is
considered as legitimate website.
Discussion. Despite the large number of research works that
have studied the detection and mitigation of phishing attacks,
the landscape of phishing is an expanding area contributing
very much to the DNS security landscape. Table 5 summarizes
the proposed methods in the literature and their strengths and
weaknesses. Low detection accuracy [42, 44], requiring large
number of train samples [39], dependency of the performance
to train inputs [39, 43], and not being adaptive to the changes
in the scenarios [44] are some of the shortcomings of the pro-
posed methods in the literature. In addition, phishers are target-
ing mobile messaging and social apps in increasing rate [45],
which requires further detailed investigations to be addressed.
3.5. DNS Manipulation
The process of diverting legitimate DNS requests to mali-
cious IP addresses, which are hosted on misbehaving servers,
is known as DNS manipulation. DNS manipulation behavior of
attackers exposes users to threats, such as phishing and content
injection. It is thus not a surprise that a large number of studies
have focused on DNS manipulation [35, 36, 37, 38].
For instance, the vulnerability of the user-side DNS infras-
tructure to record injection threats have been measured by Schomp
et al. [35]. Their analysis showed that a large number (9%) of
open DNS resolvers are vulnerable to record injection attacks
and are abused by attacks on shared DNS infrastructure. They
have measured the extent of popular record injection attacks,
e.g., Kaminsky [112] and the deployment of familiar defensive
methods, e.g., 0x20 encoding [94].
Kuhrer et al. [36] have investigated the negative aspects of
open DNS resolvers that can be abused by attackers for vari-
ous malicious activities, e.g., amplification DDoS attacks, DNS
manipulation, and cache poisoning, among others. The au-
thors have investigated the response authenticity of the open
resolvers from the user’s point of view, and found that millions
of them deliberately manipulate DNS resolutions for censor-
ing communication channels, injecting advertisements, serv-
ing malicious files, and performing phishing attacks. Further-
more, Jones et al. [113] have proposed an approach for the de-
tection of unauthorized DNS root manipulation using two dif-
ferent techniques. The first technique analyzes the latency to
root servers and the second technique analyzes route hijacks.
Their analysis revealed that the entities that are operating unau-
thorized root servers can completely control the entire Internet
name space for any system within their sphere.
Pearce et al. [37] proposed a scalable and lightweight sys-
tem, called Iris, which measures and detects the widespread of
DNS manipulation at the scale of countries, which were manip-
ulated based on tactics that rely on DNS resolvers. Iris collects
DNS queries through geographically distributed DNS resolvers
and analyzes the responses based on two metrics, the consis-
tency and the independent verifiability metrics. Iris investigates
both sensitive domains and domains of popular websites for
DNS manipulation. Their analysis showed that DNS manip-
ulation is a phenomenon that is heterogeneous across resolvers,
domain names, and countries.
Trevisan et al. [38] proposed an automatic and parameter-
free detection system, called REMeDy, which identifies rogue
DNS resolvers. REMeDy analyzes DNS traffic and evaluates
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Figure 6: General flow of the malicious domains detection based on machine
learning algorithms. It is composed of two steps; training ML model over rep-
resentative features of labeled domain names and then using the trained model
to classify unknown domain names.
Table 6: Summary of the research works that have investigated malicious do-
main detection. Here G is Generic, L is Lightweight, P is Proactive, AR is
Accuracy Rate, E is Evadable, DID is Dependency on Input Data, and LV do-
nates Local Visibility.
Work Method Adv. Disadv.G L P AR E DID LV
[26] ML/statistical 3 7
[39] EXPOSURE 3 7 7 7
[46] Notos 3 7 7 7
[47] Kopis 3 7
[48] Ext. EXPOSURE 3 7 7 7
[49] Prophiler 3 7
[50] Proactive blacklisting 3 7
[51] Temporal correlation 3 7
[52] PREDATOR 3 7 7
[55] Syntactic/temporal 3 7
[58] Woodpecker 3 7
the consistency of responses across all resolvers for automatic
identification of manipulated responses.
Discussion. DNS infrastructure suffers from multiple issues,
e.g., inefficient look-ups, unreliability of IP-level fragmenta-
tion, and ISP-driven DNS manipulation [34]. Moreover, record
injection vulnerabilities, e.g., Kaminsky [112] are widespread
[35]. Attackers can utilize standard-conforming resolvers to
circumvent mitigation techniques e.g., source port randomiza-
tion as well as IP address randomization [23, 38] to manipu-
late DNS. In addition, ISPs are clearly willing to involve in
DNS manipulation for reasons, such as error traffic moneti-
zation [75]. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that root
servers can be abused by unauthorized entities for malicious
activities, such as blocking access to websites or manipulate
responses through MITM proxies [113].
3.6. Malicious Domains Detection
Domains and domain names provide a hierarchy of unique
identifiers that guide traffic across the Web and identify web-
sites, servers and other resources. Notwithstanding, in the form
of malicious domains, they are an essential apparatus in the
hands of miscreants. There are no silver bullets for securing
against malicious domains. Nonetheless, understanding domain
names can enable firms and individual stakeholders to protect
themselves against attacks. A wide variety of research works
have been done for accurate detection of malicious domain names[47,
39, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 26, 55, 56, 57, 58].
This work is classified into two general categories, clas-
sification based [46, 47, 39, 48, 26] and inference based [51,
55, 58]. The classification based approaches rely on local net-
work and host information; however, inference based approach
exploits the global information along with local information.
The general structure of the malicious domain detection sys-
tems based on classification approaches is shown in Figure 6.
Classification based approach. Antonakakis et al. [46] have
presented a malicious domain detection system, Notos, which
works based on assigning dynamic reputation score to any do-
main name in a DNS query. Notos maintains up-to-date DNS
information of domain names by gathering such information
from various sources such as the DNS zone and associated IP
addresses, BGP prefixes, AS information, and honeypot analy-
sis. This information is then used to build models of benign/ma-
licious domain names, and then used to calculate the reputation
scores of new domains indicative of their maliciousness.
Instead of monitoring traffic from local recursives, Anton-
akakis et al. [47] presented Kopis, which detects malware-related
domains by monitoring DNS traffic at the upper DNS hierarchy.
Kopis offers a new set of traffic features, including daily pat-
terns of domain name resolution, the significance of requesters
within each epoch, and the reputation of IP addresses that lever-
age a global visibility, thus leading to an early detection of ma-
licious domains. Kopis offers independent malware domain de-
tection within DNS operator’s authority and works well even if
there is no available information about IP reputation.
Bilge et al. [39] have presented a malicious domain detec-
tion system, called EXPOSURE, which analyzes a large set of
passive DNS records. EXPOSURE analyzes various charac-
teristics of DNS names and the way that they are queried, and
extracts various kinds of features, namely time-based feature,
DNS answer-based features, TTL value-based features, and do-
main name-based feature. These features are then used to de-
sign a decision tree based classifier that automatically detects
a wide range of malicious domain names, e.g., botnet C&C
servers, phishing sites, and scam hosts. Later they extended
their work by analyzing a large set of real-world DNS requests
over 17 months period of EXPOSURE’s operation [48]. They
showed that EXPOSURE is able to make meaningful connec-
tions between various malicious domains. For example, there
exist IP addresses that are shared among thousands of unique
domain names indicative of botnet-related domain names.
Jin et al. [26] have investigated the characteristics of the
DNS log of botnet domain resolution to extract representative
features, e.g., Number of source IPs, Total querying per day,
Querying per hour etc. These features are then used to build a
malicious domain detection system that consists of three differ-
ent classification algorithms: Adaboost, DT, and NB.
Inference-based approach. Strong associations of domains
with known malicious domains is a vital point in effective ma-
licious domain detection. Therefore, Khalil et al. [54] have de-
signed an association-based scheme for the detection of mali-
9
cious domains with high accuracy and coverage. They have
analyzed active DNS data and extracted two types of features,
namely, domain based features and IP block based features.
These features are then used to accurately distinguish public IPs
from dedicated ones, consequently building high-quality asso-
ciations between domain names and identifying malicious do-
mains. Furthermore, Gao et al. [51] have utilized temporal cor-
relation analysis of DNS queries to detect unknown malicious
domains based on the related known malicious anchor domains.
The proposed approach is able to detect a wide range of corre-
lated malicious domain groups, e.g., phishing, spam, and DGA-
generated domains. The results demonstrated that on average
each of the known malicious anchor domains can detect more
than 53 previously unknown malicious domains.
Luo et al. [55] have proposed a comprehensive framework
that uses evolutionary learning for detection of diverse clusters
of DNS failures, e.g., highly random, mutated string, and sub-
string domain name failure patterns using different syntactic
and temporal patterns. In order to reduce the computational
cost, less suspicious clusters were removed while more suspi-
cious cases were preserved for further analysis.
Time-of-registration detection. Early detection of potentially
malicious DNS domains are of high importance for network
operators, registries or registrars, and law enforcement profes-
sionals to defend against many Internet attacks. Therefore, Hao
et al. [53] have explored registration behaviors of malicious do-
mains with an eye towards features that might indicate the mali-
ciousness of a domain at the time of registration. The character-
istics of registrars, domains life cycle, and names patterns were
investigated and the results showed that spammers use a small
set of registrars to register previously used domains in bulk.
Hao et al. [52] have proposed a malicious domain detec-
tion system, PREDATOR, that proactively detects malicious
domains using time-of-registration statistical features, includ-
ing registration history features, domain profile features, and
batch correlation features. These features are used to build
ML-based classifier, e.g., SVM, CMP that detects malicious do-
mains before they appear in DNS blacklists. Moreover, Felegy-
hazi et al. [50] proposed an approach for proactive malicious
domain blacklisting that relies on registration and name server
information of small set of known malicious domains to predict
whether a larger set of domains are malicious. Their analysis
showed that on average 3.5 to 15 new domains can be derived
from a given known malicious domain.
Web-based approach. Ma et al. [56] have studied application
of batch and online learning approaches for detection of ma-
licious web sites using live feed of labeled URLs and based
on the lexical and host-based features. Their analysis showed
that size of the training dataset and changes on the distribu-
tion of the features affects the performance of the batch algo-
rithms. However, online confidence weighted algorithm is able
to classify the labeled URLs in real time and with high accu-
racy. Furthermore, Canali et al. [49] have proposed a malicious
web pages detection system based on a fast and reliable filter,
Prophiler, that filters out benign web pages from further costly
analysis. Prophiler examines a web page for malicious contents
using different types of static features, such as HTML features,
Attacker
C2 server (AGD)
DGA code
Malware
Infected host
2. Generate domain name
1. Infect with malware
3. Access
Figure 7: The General overview of the communication of the malware-infected
hosts with C&C servers. DGAs are being used as main method of communica-
tion in botnets.
JavaScript features, URL and host-based features.
Discussion. Although there exists a large body of research
devoted to detection of malicious domain names, miscreants
have used the DNS to build malicious network infrastructure,
e.g., botnet [11]. The summary of the proposed methods and
their strengths and weaknesses are listed in Table 6. Short-
comings of the proposed methods can be summarized as fol-
lowing: low detection accuracy [46, 49, 26, 50, 52], local vis-
ibility [46, 39, 48], expensive computation [56], dependency
on training dataset [46, 39, 48, 47], requiring correlation be-
tween anchor malicious domain and unknown malicious do-
mains [55, 51], and can be evaded by avoiding certain features
or behaviors [39, 48, 52].
3.7. Domain Generation Algorithm
Malware operation sometimes relies on a fixed domain or
IP addresses, which can be hindered quickly. Thus, the primary
idea of Domain generation algorithms (DGAs) were instead of
developing new versions of the malware or setting everything
up at another server, the malware would transfer its C&C to
another domain at regular intervals. DGAs are utilized to in-
termittently produce a large number of domain names and usu-
ally for malicious purposes. For instance, Figure 8 shows a
sample DGA code that is utilized to generate algorithmic do-
main names. DGAs are being used as the main method of
communication in botnets. For example, Figure 7 shows an
overview of the communication of malware-infected hosts with
C&C servers. There exist several research works that explored
the ecosystem of DGAs [59, 60, 61, 28, 12, 62].
Yadav et al. [59] studied algorithmically generated domain
names for domain fluxing. Statistical measures, such as Kullback-
Leibler divergence [114], Jaccard index, and the Levenshtein
edit distance were used to explore whether a group of domains
are algorithmically generated or not. They have applied their
method to Tier-1 ISP’s DNS traces and the results showed that
it can automatically detect domain fluxing, even for unknown
and unclassified botnets, e.g., Mjuyh.
Plohmann et al. [28] have conducted a large-scale measure-
ment study to understand domain generating malware. They
investigated and presented a taxonomy for 43 DGA-based mal-
ware families to identify and compare their characteristics. Us-
ing reverse engineering and re-implementation of the algorithms
they pre-computed more than 159M possible DGA-based do-
main names, which can be used for both predictive blocking
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1 def generate_domain(y, m, d):
2 domain =
3 for i in range(16):
4 y=((yˆ8*y)>>11)ˆ((y&0xFFFFFFF0)<<17)
5 m=((mˆ4*m)>>25)ˆ16*(m&0xFFFFFFF8)
6 d=((dˆ(d<<13))>>19)ˆ((d&0xFFFFFFFE)<<12)
7 dm+=chr(((yˆmˆd)%25)+97)
8 return domain
Figure 8: A sample DGA code that is utilized to intermittently generate large
number of algorithmic domain names, mainly for malicious purposes [62].
of C&C accesses as well as accurate identification of malware
families and related campaigns of future DGA domain names.
Antonakakis et al. [60] have investigated unsuccessful DNS
resolutions to detect groups of potential DGA domains. They
built a DNS-based DGA domain detection system, called Pleiades,
which works based on the characteristics of partially registered
algorithmically generated domain names.
Spaulding et al. [62] have presented a malicious domain
detection system that proactively detects algorithmically gen-
erated domain names. Their work highlighted the difference
between the number of NXDomain responses of benign and
algorithmically generated domain names prior to registration.
These patterns are then used to build a classification system us-
ing sliding time windows. Barabosch et al. [61] have presented
an automatic method to extract DGAs from malware binaries
using dynamic analysis in combination with data flow analy-
sis. In addition, a taxonomy of DGA families is defined using
time dependency and causality features. Truong et al. [12] have
analyzed DNS traffic to design a detection system for recog-
nition of algorithmically generated domain names form legit-
imate domain names. The length of domain names and their
expected values are then used to build a classifier that identi-
fies pseudo-random domain names generated by botnets, such
as Conficker [109] and Zeus [110].
Discussion. Some major challenges of detecting DGA-based
domains include constructing a taxonomy of DGA families [61,
28], collecting domain names generated by different malware
families [28], reconstruction of DGAs by reverse engineering
malware[60, 61], learning newly found DGAs (being generic) [60,
59], and low detection accuracy [12].
3.8. Domain Name Squatting
Domain name squatting, also known as cybersquatting, is
registering or using an Internet domain name with the bad intent
to profit from a trademark belonging to someone else. Cyber-
squatters register variants of popular trademark names through
different squatting strategies, including typosquatting, bitsquat-
ting, combosquatting, and soundsquatting. Domain name squat-
ting practices expose users to a variety of vulnerabilities, such
as trademark infringement, monetization, malware, and scams.
There exists several research works that attempted to investi-
gate the landscape and impact of the domain squatting [65, 67,
41, 68, 66, 69, 72], which we define below.
3.8.1. Typosquatting
Typosquatting is one of the most common forms of domain
squatting that targets Internet users who incorrectly type a web-
site address into their web browser, e.g., www.examlpe.com in-
stead of www.example.com, and mainly for monetization activ-
ities. To this end, researchers have attempted to systematically
introduce typo-generation models [63, 64]. For instance, Wang
et al. [63] have discovered common typo-generation models
of Alexa top domain list, namely missing-dot typos, character-
omission typos, character-permutation typos, character-substitution
typos, and character-duplication typos. Similarly, Banerjee et
al. [64] have suggested different methods for generating ty-
posquatting domains, including 6.1-mod-inplace, 7.1-mod-deflate,
and 8.1-mod-inflate. Furthermore, Spaulding et al. [5] have ex-
plored the landscape of the typosquatted domain names and
summarized common typo-generation models and monetiza-
tion strategies, which are shown in Figure 9.
Agten et al. [65] conducted a longitudinal study of typosquat-
ting domains and trends. Their analysis showed that 95% of
the studied top domains are targeted by typosquatters; however,
only few trademark owners take protection practices, such as
proactive registration of typosquatted domains. Furthermore,
they observed a change in the trend and monetization behaviors
of typosquatters over time and through hosting different types
of websites, e.g., parked/ads/for sale domains and scams. More-
over, Szurdi et al. [66] conducted a large-scale measurement
of typosquatting domain registrations in the .com TLD. This
study explores the monetization strategies among less known
domains. Their analysis showed that 95% of typosquatting do-
mains target the long tail of the popularity distribution. In ad-
dition, they found that typosquatting domains constitute 20%
of the domains in the .com TLD and the trend is increasing.
Moreover, et al. [64] revealed that for a given authoritative do-
main the percentage of active typosquatting domains decreases
remarkably as the popularity of domains decline.
However, the results of these two research works [66, 65]
are in contrast to the results presented by
Khan et al. [67] have explored the impact of typosquatted
domains on the users through measuring the harm experienced
by users using intent inference metric. Their analysis showed
that typosquatting practice increases the time it takes to find an
intended website, generally 1.3 seconds per typosquatting event
over the alternative of receiving a browser error page.
Spaulding et al. [68, 69] have conducted a user study to un-
derstand the effectiveness of the typosquatting strategies in de-
ceiving users. The behaviour of users, who have been exposed
to several typosquatting URLs, have been examined in an at-
tempt to figure out whether their behavior is improved by secu-
rity education and increasing their awareness about typosquat-
ters. They found that user’s behavior is affected the most by fac-
tors such as age and education. Furthermore, the results showed
that typo-generation models, such as permutations and substi-
tutions of characters are among the most effective techniques in
deceiving users, as opposed to techniques that rely on adding
characters to the domain names.
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Figure 9: Common typo-generation models and monetization strategies. Notice
that permutations and substitutions of characters are among the most effective
techniques in deceiving users.
3.8.2. Bitsquatting
The main premise of bitsquatting [71, 70] is hardware mal-
function and it refers to registration of domain names with one
different bit from popular domain names in an attempt to re-
ceive unintentional traffic caused by bit-flip errors in the mem-
ory of computers. This theory is tested, for the first time, by
Dinaburg [70] through investigating all HTTP requests to 30
registered bitsquatted versions of popular domain names, e.g.,
amazon.com. The results of eight months of experience showed
that there were over 52K bitsquat requests from more than 12K
unique IP addresses, highlighting the feasibility and presence
of bitsquatting. Finally, a hardware-based defense strategy that
analyzes the integrity of data stored in hardware is introduced.
Furthermore, Nikiforakis et al. [71] explored the bitsquatting
phenomenon in more detail and found that attackers register
new bitsquatting domains daily. Their results showed that bit-
squatting domains involve different monetization practices, such
as parked/ads/for sale domains, affiliate marketing, and scams.
Finally, they reviewed possible defense strategies against bit-
squatting, such as data integrity validation, DNSSEC, and pre-
registering all possible bitsquatting domains.
Vissers et al. [72] have conducted a large-scale analysis
of configuration issues, e.g., typosquatting and hardware er-
rors, e.g., bitsquatting over 10K popular name server domains.
Their analysis confirmed the presence of squatting vulnerabil-
ities among name servers, thus compromising all domains that
rely on them. Furthermore, they analyzed the security practices
of popular name servers and found that 12K domains are di-
rectly exposed to being hijacked through configuration errors
related to their name server and 52.8M domains are being tar-
geted by name server bitsquatters. Finally, they suggested de-
ployment of DNSSEC as an effective countermeasure.
3.8.3. Combosquatting
Combosquatting is a type of domain squatting in which a
popular trademark is combined with one or multiple phrases,
e.g., www.youtube-login.com instead of www.youtube.com. In
order to explore its scope, Kintis et al. [41] have analyzed Lexi-
cal characteristics and temporal properties of DNS records, col-
lected from PDNS and ADNS sources over six years, for in
depth and long-term analysis of combosquatting domains. The
results showed that combosquatting domains are generated by
adding a single token to the original domain and they are far
more prevalent than typosquatting. In addition, they found that
combosquatting domains are increasing in numbers, while large
fraction of them (≈60%) stay active for more than 1000 days.
3.8.4. Soundsquatting
Soundsquatting is a type of domain squatting technique that
takes the advantage of homophones words and the users con-
fusion, such as such as whether, weather and idle, idol, idyll
to generate squatted domains. Nikiforakiset al. [73] have ex-
plored the landscape of soundsquatting and showed that attack-
ers are already familiar with soundsquatting concepts, e.g., gen-
erative models of soundsquatted domains and are monetizing
them in different ways, such as parked/ads/for sale domains,
hit stealing, and affiliate marketing. Furthermore, they pro-
posed a tool, Auto Sound Squatter (AutoSS), that automatically
generates soundsquatting domains. In addition, they showed
that users are exposed to soundsquatting through the abuse of
text-to-speech software, including the built-in screen reader of
Windows XP, Windows 7 and Mac OS X, the Thunder screen
reader [115], ORCA [116], and Skyvi [117].
Discussion. Researchers have identified various domain squat-
ting strategies e.g., typosquatting, bitsquatting, etc., which are
listed in Table 7 along with the summary, contribution, and lim-
itations of the research works that investigated them. Despite
the proposed methods to mitigate domain squatting, squatting
phenomenon is continuing to thrive and expand [66, 41]. The
limitations of the existing research proposals can be summa-
rized as following: 1) lack of practical yet automatic domain
squatting detection system [41], 2) requiring a huge amount of
user traffic or content for building models [67], and 3) lack of
practical yet effective mitigation techniques [71, 72, 70]. For
instance, the research proposals which suggest deployment of
DNSSEC [71, 72] should consider the fact that deployment rate
of DNSSEC although increasing but still far from ideal point.
3.9. Parked Domain Monetization
Domain parking refers to the registration of an Internet do-
main name without having the domain associated with any ser-
vices such as e-mail or a website. Domain parking can be clas-
sified as monetized and non-monetized. In the former, adver-
tisements are shown to visitors and the domain is monetized;
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Table 7: Summary of the works that have studied the landscape of the domain name squatting. T= Typosquatting, B= Bitsquatting, C= Combosquatting, SS=
Soundsquatting, PAF= Parked/Ads/For sale domains, S= Scams, HS= Hit Stealing, and AM= Affiliate Marketing.
Work Method Monetization strategy Contribution DisadvantagesT B C SS PAF S HS AM
[5] 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Squatting comparison —
[41] 3 3 Combosquatting No detection
[63] 3 3 Typo-generation models Limited data
[65] 3 3 3 Longitudinal study Limited data
[66] 3 3 3 YATT mitigation tool Updating blacklist
[67] 3 3 Typosquatting detector Large user traffic
[70] 3 3 3 3 Bitsquatting/defense impractical
[71] 3 3 3 3 Bitsquatting/defense Costly/impractical
[72] 3 3 3 Name server squatting Low deployment
[73] 3 3 3 3 Soundsquatting Accuracy rate
whereas, non-monetized parked domains reserve the domain
name for future development or to protect against the possi-
bility of cybersquatting. Despite technically being a legitimate
business, parked domain monetization can get mixed up with
suspicious practices and malicious contents such as malware.
Therefore, several works were conducted to understand parked
domains and monetization strategies [74, 66, 75, 76].
Alrwais et al. [74] carried out a comprehensive study on the
dark side of the parked domains to understand monetization,
its scope, and magnitude. They controlled the start and end
node of the monetization process, using an infiltration method,
to send crawling traffic among specified start and end nodes
with the monetization entities in between. Their analysis of one
thousand seed redirection chains proved the presence of threats,
such as click fraud, traffic spam, and traffic stealing in the mon-
etization process. In addition, the results of this study showed
that the revenue of the responsible parties for illicit monetiza-
tion activities is as high as 40% of the total revenues.
Szurdi et al. [66] have conducted a large-scale measurement
study to understand the impact of typosquatting on the moneti-
zation strategies of attackers among less known domains. Their
analysis showed that large proportion (95.0%) of the typosquat-
ting domains are targeting less popular websites for domain
monetization techniques e.g., parked ads. Furthermore, Weaver
et al. [75] have investigated the error traffic monetization prac-
tices of ISPs through analyzing 66,000 Netalyzr session traces.
Their analysis showed that ISPs were clearly involving on error
traffic monetization by rerouting traffic to ad servers.
Vissers et al. [76] have investigated the ecosystem of parked
domains from security view point to understand the security
risks of parked domains on users. Their analysis showed that
parked domains expose users into a set of threats, e.g., malware,
scam, and inappropriate content. Finally, they have presented
a RF-based parked domain detection system through analyz-
ing a set of generic features, including HTML features, HTTP
archive features, frame Features, and domain name features.
Discussion. Although domain parking is technically a legit-
imate business, it has been mixed up with malicious practices
such as click fraud, malware, scam, malicious contents, etc. [76,
74]. Dishonest parking services offer high revenue for respon-
sible parties, which may compromise the benefits of legitimate
advertisers and traffic buyers, by manipulating the traffic and
redirecting them to rogue ad servers [74]. Moreover, domain
monetization is prevalent among both popular domains and less
known domains [66]. In addition, ISPs actively involve traffic
monetization activities [75].
3.10. Privacy Leakage
A range of works have been conducted to address privacy-
related issues of DNS [122, 77, 121, 78, 123, 79, 120, 124,
125, 126]. For example, Herrmann et al. [77] have explored
the emerging threat of third-party DNS resolvers, e.g., Google
Public DNS and OpenDNS to online privacy and introduced a
lightweight privacy-preserving name resolution service called
EncDNS. EncDNS is designed based on the encapsulation of
encrypted messages in standards-compliant DNS messages. EncDNS
is compatible with existing popular DNS resolvers and offers
low-latency DNS resolution. Furthermore, Shulman [127] have
explored the existing proposals on DNS privacy that suggested
encryption of DNS requests as a solution. The results demon-
strated that a straightforward application of encryption alone
may not provide the desired DNS privacy protection.
Krishnan et al. [121] have explored the privacy implica-
tions of DNS prefetching. Their analysis showed that an ad-
versary can abuse the context inserted to a resolver’s cache
through prefetching to launch disclosure attacks, e.g., recon-
structing searched terms. Thus, they suggested that DNS prefetch-
ing should be turned off by default.
Zhu et al. [120] have presented a connection-oriented DNS,
called T-DNS, to address the privacy and security issues of the
connectionless DNS. T-DNS takes advantage of both TCP and
TLS: while TCP protects the server against amplification at-
tacks, TLS defends against eavesdroppers to the RDNS resolvers.
In addition, Reddy et al. [128] have explored the protection
of the privacy-sensitive information of DNS queries and re-
sponses. They presented a protection mechanism, called the
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS), for DNS exchange.
DTLS counters passive listening and active attacks. The pro-
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Table 8: Summary of the research works that have studied DNS privacy landscape.
Work Method strengths Weaknesses
[77] EncDNS Lightweight/Low-latency Unresolveable internal domains
[78] PPDNS Improved privacy Complex/DNS modification
[79] DLV-Aware/PP-DLV Improved privacy MITM attacks/record modification
[118] Range query Simple/flexible Bandwidth/response latency
[119] PIR Improved bandwidth Protocol modification
[120] T-DNS Improved privacy/security Response latency
[121] No DNS prefetching Inference attacks Inaccurate TTL/Unstable profiles
posed mechanism reduces the DTLS round trips and the hand-
shake size as well.
Zhao et al. [118] have investigated the privacy disclosure of
DNS queries and proposed a privacy-preserving query scheme,
called Range Query, which reduces privacy disclosure by con-
cealing the actual queries using noisy traffic. However, Castillo-
Perez and Garcı´a-Alfaro [122] demonstrated that the privacy
ensured by noisy traffic is not only difficult to analyze, but
also does introduce undesired latency and bandwidth consump-
tion. Castillo-Perez and Garcı´a-Alfaro [122] have evaluated
two DNS privacy-preserving proposals, the Range Query [118]
and the Privacy Information Retrieval (PIR) schemes [119].
They demonstrated that both of these approaches are not de-
sired. The first approach increases the latency and the band-
width during the execution and resolution of queries. Although
the second approach is designed to address the limitations of
the first approach, e.g., bandwidth consumption, its functional-
ity requires major modification of the DNS protocol, and relies
on the use of DNSSEC.
Lu and Tsudik [78] explored DNS privacy leaks during do-
main resolution and presented Privacy-Preserving DNS (PPDNS)
that mitigates the privacy issues in DNS. PPDNS takes advan-
tage of both distributed hash tables (DHTs) and computational
private information retrieval (cPIR). While DHT is an alterna-
tive naming infrastructure that provides name resolution query
privacy, cPIR reduces communication overhead. However, Fed-
errath et al. [129] argue that although PPDNS provides high
level of privacy, it would not be adopted in the near future due
to its computational complexity and requirement for completely
different DNS infrastructure.
DNS blocking of unintended queries is among the suggested
solutions to improve the DNS privacy. For example, Appel-
baum and Muffett [130] have studied Tor’s privacy and sug-
gested to block .onion names at stub, recursive, and authorita-
tive resolvers to improve it’s privacy. Mohaisen and Ren [125]
have investigated the leakage of .onion at the A and J DNS
root nodes over a longitudinal period of time and have found
that .onion leakage is common and persistent at DNS infras-
tructure. Furthermore, Mohaisen et al. [126] have studied the
impact of blocking of unintended queries under different ad-
versarial settings on the DNS privacy. The results highlighted
that partial blocking at stub resolver would negatively affect the
DNS privacy under certain adversary models; however, block-
ing the queries at the recursive would result in favorable privacy
outcomes.
Discussion. Full and proper deployment of DNSSEC relies on
cooperation between domain owners, name server owners, reg-
istries, and ISPs. Thus, various methods have been proposed to
improve the privacy of DNS which are listed in Table 8 along
with their strengths and weaknesses. It should be noted that
DNSSEC does not necessarily protect privacy. Although DNS
over TLS protects against eavesdropping, it is not clear what of
privacy it offers. In addition, existing approaches require mod-
ifications to the DNS protocols [118]. Privacy issues have been
overlooked by DNS security efforts (such as DNSSEC) and are
thus likely to propagate into future versions of DNS [78], re-
quiring further attention.
4. DNS Research Methods
This section is devoted to investigating various data analysis
methods, utilized to detect, model, and mitigate the aforemen-
tioned DNS threats. As it is outlined in Figure 10, the con-
ducted research works will be categorized under data collection
methods, data analysis techniques, and the scope of the anal-
ysis. This categorization will help us to better understand the
advantages and disadvantages of different methodologies in the
DNS security and privacy landscape, which will be an asset for
future investigations. The topical classification of the DNS re-
search methods, with sample works, is presented in Table 14.
4.1. Data Collection Methods
This section will describe two main DNS data collection
methods, the passive DNS (PDNS) data and active DNS (ADNS)
data, and the associated works.
4.1.1. Passive DNS
Florian Weimer [135] has invented “Passive DNS” or “Pas-
sive DNS replication” technology to opportunistically recon-
struct a partial view of the data available in the global DNS into
a central database for further investigations. End-user’s interac-
tions can be monitored as they happen using passive monitor-
ing [136]. High-level architecture of passive DNS measurement
systems is shown in Figure 11. Passive DNS databases based on
valuable information they collect, have been considered as an
invaluable asset of cybersecurity researchers to combat a wide
range of threats such as malware, botnets, and malicious ac-
tors [80, 47, 81, 82, 83, 12, 11, 84, 48, 41, 67, 22, 51].
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Table 9: Topical classification threats addressed in the literature, with
sample work. MD=Malicious Domains, CP=Cache Poisoning,PH=Phishing,
MA=Manipulation, AD=Amplification/DoS, DG=Domain Generation,
B=Botnet, DS=Domain Squatting, M=Monetization, PL=Privacy Leakage.
Work M
D
C
P
PH M
A
A
D
D
G
B D
S
M PL
[1] 3
[6] 3
[7] 3
[9] 3
[10] 3
[11] 3
[12] 3 3 3
[13] 3 3
[16] 3
[17] 3
[18] 3
[19] 3
[20] 3
[21] 3
[22] 3
[23] 3
[26] 3 3
[27] 3 3 3 3
[28] 3 3
[29] 3 3
[34] 3
[35] 3
[36] 3 3
[37] 3
[39] 3 3 3 3
[40] 3
[41] 3 3 3
[46] 3
[47] 3 3 3 3
[48] 3
[49] 3
[50] 3
[51] 3
[52] 3
[53] 3 3
[54] 3
[55] 3
[56] 3
[57] 3
[58] 3 3
[66] 3 3
[59] 3 3 3
[67] 3
[72] 3
[74] 3
[75] 3 3
[76] 3 3
[77] 3
Table 10: Topical classification of the DNS threats addressed in the literature,
cont. of Table 9.
Work M
D
C
P
PH M
A
A
D
D
G
B D
S
M PL
[78] 3
[79] 3
[82] 3
[84] 3
[88]
[89] 3 3
[99] 3
[113] 3
[120] 3
[121] 3
[122] 3
[123] 3
[125] 3
[126] 3
[131] 3
[132] 3
[133] 3
[134] 3
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Figure 10: DNS Research Methods. We have categorized DNS research method
into data collection methods, data analysis techniques, and analysis scope.
For example, Callahan et al. [81] have analyzed 200 million
DNS queries collected through passive monitoring of DNS traf-
fic of 90 home residential neighborhood network in the U.S. [137]
in order to investigate the evolution and the behavior of the DNS
servers and clients in modern DNS systems. Moreover, Gao
et al. [51] have analyzed 26 billion DNS query-response pairs
collected by Security Information Exchange (SIE), now part of
DNSDB [138], from more than 600 recursive DNS resolvers
distributed over North America and Europe, to empirically re-
examine the performance and the operational characteristics of
the DNS infrastructure. In addition, they found that temporal
correlation analysis of the collected passive DNS queries can
be used to detect malicious domain names.
Hao and Wang [22] have studied 1.2 billion trace logs of
outgoing DNS queries collected at local DNS servers at the Col-
lege of William and Mary (WM) and the University of Delaware
(UD) to understand the impact of one-time-use domain names
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Figure 11: High-level architecture of passive DNS collection system. In pas-
sive DNS collection, the DNS requests and responses are gathered from DNS
providers across the internet as they happen.
on the performance of DNS caching. In addition, Alrwais et
al. [80] have analyzed 1.5 TB of passive DNS data collected
by monitoring 25 snapshots of the entire IPv4 address space
to systematically study the trend of BulletProof Hosting (BPH)
services and potential detection and mitigation methods.
Liu et al. [58] have queried passive DNS data from Farsight
Security passive DNS database, DNSDB [138], and the biggest
public passive DNS system in China [139] to detect malicious
domains. Moreover, Tajalizadehkhoob et al. [82] have analyzed
1,259 shared hosting providers extracted from DNSDB[138] to
explore the distribution of web security features and software
patching practices in shared hosting providers.
Furthermore, Khan et al. [67] have utilized passive DNS
data to study the negative impact of the typosquatting on the
users through the time it takes to find the intended website.
Kintis et al. [41] have analyzed 13.1 billion passive DNS RRs
collected from the largest ISP in the U.S., to understand how
combosquatting is used by miscreants for malicious purposes.
Bilge et al. [48] have analyzed the passive DNS data ob-
tained by SIE [140] to detect and block malicious domain names
in real time. In addition, Li et al. [84] have investigated the
topological relation of hosts and malicious websites using the
same PDNS API, SIE [140]. Moreover, Perdisci et al. [11]
have utilized the SIE PDNS traffic to detect and track malicious
domain-flux networks. Similarly, Truong et al. [12] have ana-
lyzed passive DNS traffic for detection of domain-flux botnets
within a monitored LAN network.
Although passive DNS data is widely used to study and ad-
dress to various vulnerabilities of DNS, e.g., malware, botnets,
domain squatting, etc. [51, 22, 67, 12], the collection of such
data is costly, challenging, and needs restrictive legal agree-
ments [83].
4.1.2. Active DNS
The concept of active DNS measurement have been pre-
sented to tackle the potential barriers of DNS security research.
Active DNS measurement cannot be a replacement for passive
DNS measurement; however, it offers several advantages in
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Figure 12: High-level architecture of a typical active DNS collection system.
Active DNS collection is composed of four main steps including gathering do-
main seeds, generating queries, collecting responses, and storing/processing the
data in Hadoop cluster.
comparison to its counterpart [83]. For example, Internet ac-
tivities of real users would not fluctuate active measurements.
In addition, active DNS measurements could be largely avail-
able with least privacy concerns, while it offers an order of
magnitude more domain names and IP addresses. Therefore,
researchers have developed and used active DNS measurement
systems to address DNS security threats [67, 113, 83, 85, 54,
41, 86, 141]. Generally, active DNS collection systems are
composed of four main components: domain seeds, query gen-
erator, collection point, and storage. The list of the domains
to be queried are gathered in domain seeds. These lists are re-
quested using query generator and the responses are collected
at the collection point and then stored in Hadoop cluster for fur-
ther analysis. High-level architecture of active DNS collection
system is shown in Figure 12.
Kountouras et al. [83] have presented an active DNS mea-
surement called Thales, which reliably queries, collects, and
distills active DNS datasets. A set of large-scale seed domain
list including public blacklists [142, 143, 144], the Alexa list [145],
the Common Crawl dataset [146], the domain feed from an
undisclosed security vendor, and the zone files for the TLDs
consisting of .com, .net, .biz and .org constitute the list of seed
domains. Moreover, Van Rijswijk-Deij et al. [85] have pre-
sented OpenINTEL, an active DNS measurement system that
conducts daily measurement for all of the domains in .com, .net,
and .org TLDs. OpenINTEL reliably queries and collects over
50% of the global DNS data based on daily active measure-
ments and since February 2015.
Moreover, Khan et al. [67] have actively crawled 13.5k sus-
pected domains to study the impact of typosquatting events on
both typical users and legitimate websites. Kintis et al. [41]
have analyzed 455 billion DNS RRs collected daily through
the active DNS project [147, 83] from November 2015 to Au-
gust 2016, to investigate how attackers utilize combosquatting
to conduct variety of malicious activities including trademark
infringement, malware, monetization, and phishing. Moreover,
Khalil et al. [54] have conducted an in-depth analysis of ac-
tive DNS dataset provided by Thales [147, 83] to design an
association-based scheme for detection of malicious domains
with high accuracy and coverage.
Chung et al. [86] have collected all DNSSEC-enabled do-
main names, under the .com, .org, and .net TLDs through Open-
INTEL active DNS measurement system [85], to study the adop-
tion and management of DNSSEC in both authoritative name
servers and DNS resolvers. Moreover, Toorn et al. [148] have
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Table 11: Summary of the data collection methods used in research works. Here TB is Terra Byte, M is Million, B is Billion, and LDNS donates local DNS servers.
(1)WM and (2) are the Collage of William and Mary and the University of Delaware, respectively.
Work Method Volume Query Types Data Scale Source
A A
A
A
A
M
X
N
S
T
X
T
PT
R
SR
V
SO
A
C
N
A
M
E
D
S
D
N
SK
E
Y
N
SE
C
[22]
PDNS 1.01B 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2015-06 to 2015-07 LDNS at WM(1)
PDNS 0.19B 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2015-12 LDNS at UD(2)
[41]
PDNS 13.1B 2011-01 to 2015-10 Largest ISP in the U.S.
ADNS 455B 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2015-10 to 2016-08 com/name/net/org/biz/Alexa 1M
[51] PDNS 26B 3 3 3 3 600 RDNS
[80] PDNS 1.7TB 3 3 3 3 2015-01 to 2016-08 25 snapshots of IPv4 list
[81] PDNS 200M 3 3 3 2011-01 to 2012-03 90 home residential network
[83] ADNS Source list 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Daily since 2016 com/name/net/org/biz/Alexa 1M
[85] ADNS Source list 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Daily since 2015 com/net/org/info/mobi/name/biz/asia/aero
Table 12: List of common query types and their description.
Query Type Definition
A IPv4 address
AAAA IPv6 address
MX Mail exchanger record
NS Authoritative name server
TXT Arbitrary text strings
PTR Pointer (IP address/hostname)
SRV Service (service/hostname)
SOA Start of Authority
CNAME Canonical Name (Alias/canonical)
DS Delegation of Signing
DNSKEY DNSSEC public key
NSEC Next SECure (No record/two points)
studied the detection of Snowshoe spams through active DNS
measurement and using machine learning techniques.
Discussion. Passive monitoring is better suited as a technol-
ogy to determine what goes wrong with a website or web ap-
plication after problems have occurred. Passive DNS, though,
is rare, difficult to obtain, and often comes with restrictive le-
gal clauses (i.e., non disclosure agreements). At the same time,
laws and regulations against personal identifiable information,
the significant financial cost of the passive collection, and stor-
age infrastructure are some of the reasons that make passive
DNS difficult. In addition, passive DNS datasets are limited
in scope and time. On the other hand, although active DNS
datasets offer several unique characteristics, the amount of of-
fered information would be limited. It should be noticed that
active DNS measurement highly relies on the domain seeds. In
addition, issued DNS queries based on the limited set of hosts
yields a localized DNS data collection. In other words, the col-
lected DNS data is limited to the locations of those hosts, thus
all IPs associated with a specific given name might not be iden-
tified. Furthermore, DNS queries are made by data collectors
not by individual users, which makes active DNS data less suit-
able as an approach to detect malicious domains based on user
level features of DNS data, such as user query patterns. The
summary of the collected dataset in the literature is in Table 11
along with the query types description in Table 12.
4.2. Data Analysis Methods
Cybersecurity researchers have employed variety of data
analysis techniques to effectively address to DNS threats. For
example, the application of machine learning algorithms are
widely used [80, 17, 58]. This section introduces some of the
prevalent data analysis techniques that have been used in the
cybersecurity community, such as machine learning algorithms
[80, 17, 46, 53, 22, 54, 55, 56, 87, 88, 89, 76] and association
analysis [59, 90, 54, 91, 51].
4.2.1. Machine Learning Algorithm
Antonakakis et al. [17] have designed an Machine Learn-
ing (ML)-based cache poisoning detection system, called Anax,
which detects malicious changes in cached DNS records in real
time with 91.9% of detection accuracy rate. Similarly, Hao and
Wang [22] have trained Decision Tree (DT) and Random For-
est (RF) machine learning algorithms using syntactical features
of one-time-use domain names, e.g., domain name string, the
length of query name etc. to detect and expel one-time-use
domain names from DNS cache in an attempt to increase the
performance of DNS caching.
Alrwais et al. [80] have utilized two machine learning al-
gorithms, namely SVM and RF, to build a detetction system to
identify malicious network blocks using features extracted from
the trends of the BPH services. Khalil et al. [54] have designed
a malicious domain detection system using RF model and based
on the representative features of dedicated IPs, e.g., the number
of fully qualified domain names, the number of second level
domains in its /24 IP block etc.
Liu et al. [58] have utilized a set of machine learning mod-
els including NN, RF, LR, SVM, and NB to automatically iden-
tify shadowed domains with 98.5% accuracy rate. In addition,
Vissers et al. [76] have proposed a parked domain detection
system based on RF algorithm that is trained over a set of the
generic and robust features of parked domains. Moreover, Li et
al. [149] have used TSVM algorithm instead of classical SVM
to improve the detection accuracy for phishing webpages.
4.2.2. Association Analysis
The strong associations of domains with known malicious
domains can be utilized to detect malicious domain names. For
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Table 13: Summary of the machine learning methods used in the literature. Here AR is Accuracy Rate, while FPR represents False Positive Rate. The abbreviations
of ML algorithms are described in Table 1
Work Application ML algorithm AR FPRDT RF NB KNN SVM MLP
[17] Cache poisoning 3 3 3 3 3 91.9% 0.6%
[22] Cache poisoning 3 3 88.0% 1.0%
[54] Malicious domain 3 3 3 99.0% 1.0%
[76] Parked domains 3 98.7% 0.5%
[80] Malicious network 3 3 97.1% 1.6%
[149] Phishing 3 95.5% 3.5%
example, Khalil et al. [54] have designed an association-based
scheme for detection of malicious domains with high accuracy
and coverage. Furthermore, Gao et al. [51] have utilized the
temporal correlation analysis of DNS queries to identify a wide
range of correlated malicious domain groups, e.g., phishing,
spam, and DGA-generated domains based on the related known
malicious anchor domains. Yadav et al. [59] have utilized sta-
tistical measures such as Kullback-Leibler divergence, Jaccard
index,and Levenshtein for domain-flux botnet detection. Gomez
et al. [91] have studied the application of visualization for un-
derstanding the DNS-based network threat analysis.
Discussion. Despite numerous advantages of machine learning
approaches, there are still risks and limitations of using them in
operation. The foremost challenge is the acquisition and label-
ing of relevant data from representative vantage points to maxi-
mize insights. Even if the the data is collected correctly, captur-
ing DNS traffic results in a very large amount of data to analyze,
which would be expensive in term of computation and storage.
In addition, the performance of machine learning algorithms
is contingent upon their structure and learning algorithms. It
should be noticed that selecting improper structure or learning
algorithms might result in poor results; thus, it is mandatory
to try different algorithms for each problem. Furthermore, the
training phase of the algorithm would be a time-consuming pro-
cess, even if the dataset is small, requiring training heuristics.
4.3. Data Analysis Scope
The original design of the DNS did not consider any secu-
rity details; instead, it was designed to be a scalable distributed
system. As the Internet has grown, malicious actors have found
weaknesses, mainly due to lack of DNS records verification, in
the DNS system that allows them to launch variety of attacks,
e.g., phishing, malware, etc.. Thus DNSSEC was created to
secure the DNS infrastructure. In this section, we will catego-
rize the research works from security point of view into vanilla
DNS [35, 40, 29, 92, 93, 94, 18] and DNSSEC [95, 96, 97, 86,
98, 99, 23, 9, 100]. This will help us to understand the ad-
vantages, e.g., improved security and disadvantages, e.g., over-
heads of the deployment of the DNSSEC.
4.3.1. Vanilla DNS
Although DNS is the largest distributed system, it is vulner-
able to multiple threats, such as DNS cache poisoning attacks,
Table 14: Topical classification of the DNS research methods addressed in the
literature, with sample work
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[95] 3 [113] 3
[80] 3 3 [54] 3 3
[17] 3 [67] 3 3
[46] 3 [41] 3 3
[47] 3 [83] 3 3
[48] 3 [55] 3
[81] 3 [79] 3
[49] 3 [123] 3
[21] 3 3 [19] 3
[86] 3 3 3 [11] 3
[98] 3 [87] 3
[132] 3 [88] 3 3
[150] 3 [16] 3
[51] 3 [89] 3
[53] 3 [151] 3
[22] 3 3 [82] 3
[99] 3 [12] 3
[23] 3 [85] 3
[9] 3 [76] 3
[100] 3
amplification attacks, etc.. For example, Schomp et al. [35]
have demonstrated that user-side DNS infrastructure is vulner-
able to record injection threats. Moreover, Xu et al. [29] have
demonstrated that attackers can severely abuse DNS-based stealthy
C&C channel to efficiently hide malicious DNS activities. In
addition, Schomp et al. [93] have showed that shared DNS re-
solvers are vulnerable to various forms of attack [99, 35], e.g.,
fraudulent record injection.
In order to address the security problems of the DNS in-
frastructure, which are mainly due to the lack of integrity and
authenticity of DNS records, the utilization of DNSSEC have
been suggested [23, 100].
18
4.3.2. DNS Security Extension
DNSSEC allows clients to verify the integrity and authen-
ticity of DNS records based on a chain-of-trust. Each zone in
DNSSEC is composed of two public and private key pairs, in-
cluding Key Signing Key (KSK) and Zone Signing Key (ZSK).
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) of the DNSSEC is rooted at the
KSK of the DNS root zone. Thus, the validation process of
DNS response begins at the root and continues until the record
is authenticated. An overview of the DNSSEC chain of trust is
shown in Figure 13.
Chung et al. [86] have conducted a measurement study on
deployment and management of DNSSEC in both authorita-
tive name servers and DNS resolvers. They found that only
a tiny fraction (≈1%) of all domains in three top TLDs publish
DNSKEY, including .com, .net, and .org. Additionally, their re-
sults showed that over 30% signed domains fail to upload DS
records, highlighting the failure of authoritative name servers
in uploading records for a majority of their domain names. To-
wards the client side of DNSSEC, Lian et al. [152] have studied
the capability of the resolvers and end-users to achieve DNSSEC
authentication, and concluded that DNSSEC increases the fail-
ure rate of end-to-end resolutions.
To categorize the potential root causes of the DNSSEC mis-
configurations, Adrichem et al. [95], have conducted a mea-
surement study to access the impact of misconfigurations on
the reachability of zone’s network. Their analysis showed that
only 7.93% of gathered domain names from .bg, .br, .co, and
.se zones attempted to implement DNSSEC, and over 4% were
misconfigured. Furthermore, they observed that the DNSSEC-
aware resolvers were unable to reach a large fraction (≈73.86%)
of misconfigured domains. The impact of DNSSEC miscon-
figurations on DNS query requests has also been addressed by
Deccio et al. [153], and in general, DNSSEC misconfigura-
tions can be broadly classified into four categories: DNSKEY,
RRSIG, general DNS failure, and miscellaneous. Figure 14 shows
the categories and the subcategories of DNSSEC misconfigura-
tions [95, 153].
DNS operators have a critical role in the deployment of
DNSSEC, as they are responsible for the maintenance of DNSKEY
and RRSIG records. Chung et al. [98] have studied the impact
of DNS operators, e.g., registrar, owner, or third-party DNS op-
erator, on DNSSEC deployment. They have observed that many
popular registrars fail to support DNSSEC, and as such, there
are only 3 mutual registrars among the top 25 popular, and the
top 25 fully deployed registrars.
Discussion. Correct deployment of DNSSEC relies on end-to-
end establishment of RRSIGs, a cryptographically valid DNSKEY,
and DS records. However, a small fraction of all domains (≈1%)
in the top three TLDs (.com, .net, and .org) publish DNSKEY [86].
Moreover, incomplete or incorrect deployment of DNSSEC may
lead to attacks such as domain hijacking. The threat does not
completely mitigate even after full deployment. An adaptive
attacker may still succeed in the attack by using a fake name
server, that enables off-path traffic analysis and a covert chan-
nel [99]. The hazards of DNSSEC misconfiguration are not lim-
ited to the failures; misconfigured domains are always at risk of
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Figure 13: An overview of DNSSEC chain of trust. DNSSEC utilizes public
and private key pairs to verify the integrity and authenticity of DNS records
based on a chain-of-trust. The verification process of DNS record begins at the
root and continues until the record in question is authenticated.
being unreachable from a DNSSEC-aware resolver.
5. DNS Entities Scopes
DNS infrastructure comprises of different entities, includ-
ing DNS name servers, DNS resolvers, hosting providers, and
clients. Each entity is designed to serve a specific task. DNS
infrastructure’s performance is contingent upon the collabora-
tion and synchronization of these components. In this section,
we survey the prior work to provide deeper insights about the
impact of different DNS entities on the overall system. We pro-
vide an outline of this section in Figure 15, and in Table 16,
we present the topical classification of the DNS entities as ad-
dressed in the literature, with sample works.
5.1. DNS Name Servers
A DNS server provides name resolution of names into IP
addresses, and vice versa. Extensive work has been published
to shed light on the name servers’ landscape [154, 47, 155, 156,
157, 72, 16, 158, 51, 159].
5.1.1. Authoritative Name Server
An authoritative name server is responsible for answering
queries related to a particular domain name in a zone. The
server response contains actual DNS records of the queried do-
main name, such as A, CNAME, PTR, etc., which highlight the
importance of the server’s performance and security. List of the
common query types are reported in Table 12. Hao et al. [154]
have investigated the characteristics of DNS, e.g., performance,
availability, life-cycle and deployment patterns. In their work,
they analyzed three major types of DNS servers namely private,
upstream, and hybrid authoritative DNS servers, and showed
that a majority of websites host the authoritative DNS servers
in upstream services for better performance.
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Figure 14: Overview of DNSSEC misconfigurations. In general, DNSSEC mis-
configurations can be categorized in four groups, including DNSKEY, RRSIG,
general DNS failure, and miscellaneous.
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Figure 15: DNS Entities Scope. We have categorized research works based
on the main scope of the entities into DNS name servers, open DNS resolvers,
hosting services, and clients.
Liang et al. [158] studied the impact of top level DNS servers’
uneven distribution on the end-user latency. They observed that
despite good performance of top level DNS severs, the qual-
ity of the service was unfair in different continents including
Africa and South America. In those regions, the performance
was 3–6 times worse than Europe and North America. Further-
more, they made two useful observations: 1. Almost all the root
servers in Europe and North America work efficiently. 2. Only
F, J, and L roots show low query latency in other continents.
Malicious domains can be identified by the number of name
servers that a domain name interacts with over time. For in-
stance, Felegyhazi et al. [50] have utilized the inherent charac-
teristics of domain registrations and their appearance in DNS
zone files to build a proactive malicious domain detection sys-
tem. Mohaisen et al. [159] presented Name Server Switching
Footprint (NSSF), a feature modality and a system that ana-
lyze and detect the domain names with suspicious name server
switching behavior. Additionally, in the same work, they have
designed a time series prediction model to predict the number
of name servers that a domain is likely to interact with.
Due to the critical role of the authoritative name servers
in DNS infrastructure, they have been analyzed from a secu-
rity point of view as well. For example, Vissers et al. [72]
have investigated the security practices of authoritative name
servers, and observed that a large number of domain names
(≈1.28M) are under the risk of DoS attacks due to weak secu-
rity practices of few (≈7,214) authoritative name servers. They
also suggested employment of DNSSEC as a solution to en-
hance the security of DNS. Furthermore, Chung et al. [86] have
conducted a measurement study on deployment and manage-
ment of DNSSEC in both authoritative name servers and re-
solvers. Their results showed that more than 30% of signed
domains failed to upload DS records, and some authoritative
name servers failed to upload DS records for nearly all of their
domains. Such practices, make DNSSEC ineffective and pro-
vide no practical security.
5.1.2. Recursive DNS server
A recursive DNS server is responsible to query other name
servers to resolve a domain name. While recursive DNS re-
solver is significantly important in the function of DNS, mis-
creants have exploited it to launch various attacks, e.g., DNS
amplification attack, cache poisoning, etc. Accordingly, re-
searchers have explored various aspects of recursive DNS re-
solvers including, caching performance, DNS amplification at-
tack, malware infection, etc. [155, 47, 21, 13, 22]. Chen et
al. [21] have investigated the impact of disposable domains
on the caching behavior of the DNS resolvers. Their analy-
sis showed that as the prevalence of the disposable domains in-
creases, it is likely that the DNS cache begins to fill up with
RRs, that are unlikely to be reused. Hao and Wang [22] have
studied the negative impact of one-time-use domain names on
the performance of DNS caching. They argue that removal or
not insertion of such RRs into the cache can prevent a waste of
the DNS cache resources.
Shang et al. [156] explored the relationships across domain
names to improve the cache hit rate of local DNS servers. In ad-
dition, Chen et al. [155] have presented a dynamic lease scheme
that keeps track of local DNS name servers to provide stronger
cache consistency and more reliable services. Perdisci et al. [19]
have proposed a novel method based on WSEC DNS to mitigate
recursive DNS resolvers cache poisoning attack.
Ager et al. [101] explored the impact of DNS resolvers la-
tency and the DNS cache contents on the performance of lo-
cal DNS and open DNS resolvers, e.g., GoogleDNS [160] and
OpenDNS [161]. They further observed that unlike third-party
DNS resolvers, local DNS resolvers redirect clients towards the
content available within the ISP. Kuhrer et al. [36] conducted a
large-scale study based on empirical data that is collected over
one year, to investigate the landscape of DNS resolvers. Their
analysis revealed that millions of these DNS resolvers deliber-
ately manipulate resolutions for malicious purposes.
Verma et al. [13] have utilized query rate sharing property
of DNS resolvers to build a DNS DDoS mitigation system that
calculates global DNS query rate to make mitigation decisions
locally. Moreover, Ballani et al. [7] have analyzed the caching
behavior of DNS resolvers to defend against DNS DoS attacks.
Discussion. Although top level DNS servers perform well, the
quality of service is unfair around the globe [158]. Moreover,
it is noteworthy that the vulnerability of a small number of
authoritative name servers, potentially affects a large number
of domains under their apex [72]. Authoritative name servers
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Table 15: Summary of the research works that measured the number of open
DNS resolvers.
Work Year Scope # ORDNS
[162]
2010 105.4M IPs 11.9M
2010 1.1M IPs 114.7K
[163] 2013 IPv4 IPs 32M
[164, 165]
2013 IPv4 IPs 32M
2017 IPv4 IPs 10.3M
[166]
2013 IPv4 IPs 11.9M
2017 IPv4 IPs 3.7M
[167]
2013 IPv4 IPs 33.6M
2014 IPv4 IPs 29.2M
[168] 2013 IPv4 IPs 25M
are widely exploitable through outdated WHOIS email records
of name server domains. Moreover, few authoritative name
servers are responsible for incorrect deployment of DNSSEC
in large number of domain names[86].
5.2. Open DNS Resolver
Contrary to the recursive DNS resolvers, that perform re-
cursion for the internal clients only, an open DNS resolver re-
solves recursive DNS lookups for anyone over the Internet. As
such, an open DNS resolvers is vulnerable to well known at-
tacks, e.g., DDoS on behalf of attackers. An overview of recur-
sive DNS resolvers and open DNS resolvers is shown in Fig-
ure 16 and Figure 17, respectively. To this end, extensive re-
search efforts have been devoted to study the impact of open
resolvers on the performance and security of DNS infrastruc-
ture [101, 17, 7, 51, 77, 36, 23, 37, 19, 93, 35, 13].
Based on the aforementioned properties of open resolvers,
they can be exploited by the attackers to conduct a series of
attacks. Significant research has been conducted to understand
the DNS resolvers landscape and its associated threats.
5.2.1. Measurement on the DNS Protocol
Prior work on the analysis of DNS resolvers is mostly fo-
cused on a small subset of all resolvers. Therefore, it is unclear
if the observations can be generalized on a wider scale to all the
resolvers around the globe. For instance, Sisson [162] analyzed
open resolvers based on sampled scans that repeatedly query
the same set of resolvers. Therefore, their work was limited to
only a small fraction of all the open resolvers. Antonakakis et
al. [17] have analyzed a geographically diverse set of 300,000
open resolvers to measure the integrity of their responses. They
observed that in general, the attackers point victims to rogue IP
addresses. Furthermore, Jiang et al. [27] analyzed the caching
behavior of resolvers and identified an attack vector in DNS
software that allows the extension of domains caching even af-
ter their removal from the upper DNS hierarchy.
Schomp et al. [163] randomly probed the IPv4 address
space to enumerate DNS resolvers and distinguish between re-
cursive DNS resolvers and DNS proxies. They also performed
an in-depth analysis on the caching behavior of the resolvers.
Gao et al. [51] have analyzed a large set of DNS query-response
Internal client
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External client
Recursion for internal clients
QueryQuery
Response No response
Figure 16: Overview of recursive DNS resolver. Notice that RDNS resolver
does not respond to queries of external clients.
pairs collected from over 600 recursive DNS resolvers. They
observed that despite a great variation in the characteristics of
the DNS traffic across networks, the behavior of resolvers within
an organization remains similar.
5.2.2. Internet-Wide Scanning
Durumeric et al. [169] proposed a high-speed application to
run Internet-wide scans called ZMap. ZMap is an open-source
network scanner designed to perform Internet-wide scans with
capability of surveying the entire IPv4 address space within 45
minutes. The Open Resolver Project [164, 165] actively in-
vestigates DNS servers world-wide and provides open resolver
statistics on the web. The open resolver statistics are avail-
able online from March 2013 to January 2017, after which the
scan was discontinued. Shadowserver [166] is another orga-
nization that conducts surveys related to the Internet security
including active measurements of open resolvers, with up-to-
date scans. Furthermore, Takano et al. [168] performed mea-
surements based on responses for Internet-wide DNS software
version requests. They have focused on DNS server software
and their distribution in each regional Internet registry.
5.2.3. Threats
Antonakakis et al. [17] noticed that in general, the attack-
ers point victims to rogue IP addresses through open DNS re-
solvers. Kuhrer et al. [36] have analyzed the threats in open
resolvers from two perspectives. Firstly, they scanned the DNS
resolvers’ landscape for changes in the course of time and cat-
egorized the resolvers based on their device type and the soft-
ware version. Secondly, they measured the response authentic-
ity of the resolvers from the users’ point-of-view to find that a
large number of resolvers intentionally manipulate DNS reso-
lutions for malicious activities.
Schomp et al. [35] have measured the vulnerability of the
user-side DNS infrastructure to record injection threats. They
have found that many open DNS resolvers, that are vulnerable
to record injection attacks, are used as an attack vector to target
shared DNS infrastructure. Verma et al. [13] presented a system
to mitigate Amplified DNS DDoS (ADD) attacks, that relies on
the fact that DNS resolvers share local DNS query rates that can
be used to calculate the total query rates.
Ballani et al. [7] have presented a defense scheme called
stale cache, that uses caching behavior to prevent DNS DoS
attacks.They have analyzed DNS traces under multiple DoS at-
tack strategies and have found that the cost-benefit ratio of the
proposed method, favors the deployment of stale cache. Fur-
thermore, Herrmann et al. [77] have studied third party DNS
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Figure 17: Overview of open recursive DNS resolver. Notice that ORDNS
resolver does respond to queries of both internal and external clients.
Table 16: Topical classification of the DNS research scopes addressed in the
literature, with sample work; NS=Name Servers, R=Resolvers, HS=Hosting
Services, and C=Clients.
Work N
S
R H
S
C Work N
S
R H
S
C
[95] 3 [158] 3
[101] 3 3 [55] 3
[17] 3 [56] 3
[47] 3 [171] 3
[7] 3 [37] 3
[155] 3 [19] 3
[86] 3 3 [172] 3
[51] 3 [93] 3
[173] 3 [35] 3 3
[22] 3 [174] 3
[154] 3 3 [156] 3
[77] 3 [16] 3
[99] 3 3 [89] 3
[23] 3 [82] 3
[9] 3 [12] 3
[27] 3 [13] 3
[67] 3 [72] 3
[36] 3 3 [134] 3
[84] 3
resolvers and consequent threats to online privacy. They pro-
posed a new privacy-preserving name resolution service that
relies on the encapsulation of encrypted messages in standards-
compliant DNS messages. Hendriks et al. [170] presented an
active measurement system to find the list of open DNS re-
solvers on IPv6 in the wild, which could be potentially ex-
ploited in a DDoS attack. Moreover, Schomp et al. [93] have
studied the vulnerabilities of shared DNS resolvers and pro-
posed an unorthodox method to tackle such threats.
Discussion. DNS resolvers can be easily discovered and used
by the attackers for malicious activities, such as DoS attacks.
Moreover, buggy implementations and large DNSSEC response
filtering can lead to a high query latency[158]. Although ex-
tensive research has been conducted on open DNS resolvers,
their evolution and distribution still require a clear demonstra-
tion. Some open questions that are worth addressing in this
regard are: 1. How is the distribution of open DNS resolvers in
popular TLDs? 2. Are open resolvers consistent in answering
various clients for the same query type?
5.3. Hosting services
The task for remedying compromised web resources is shared
between hosting providers and webmasters. Shared hosting
providers retain more control over configurations, which ex-
plains their association with the widespread abuse.
In [95], Adrichem et al. have conducted measurements to
identify and categorize potential causes of the DNSSEC mis-
configurations based on the reachability of a zone’s network.
They have analyzed domains in six zones, including .bg, .br,
.co, .com, .nl and .se, and noticed that a small number of host-
ing providers are responsible for DNSSEC misconfigured do-
mains. They concluded that the misconfigured domains are at
the risk of being unreachable from DNSSEC-aware resolver.
DNSSEC allows clients to verify the integrity and authenticity
of DNS records. However, DNSSEC has wittnessed a low de-
ployment rate with only 0.6% of .com, 0.8% of .net, and 1%
.org properly signed domains [86]. Chung et al. [86] have at-
tempted to identify the impact of registrars on deployment of
DNSSEC, since the registrars usually serve as DNS operators
to their customers. A DNS operator can be a registrar, an owner,
or a third-party operator, responsible for maintaining DNSKEY
and RRSIG records. Based on the registrars’ policy of upload-
ing records, DNSSEC can be fully deployed (with DS record),
or partially deployed (without DS record).
Hao et al. [154] have conducted a measurement study to un-
derstand the authoritative DNS servers’ deployment patterns in
modern web services. They have explored several characteris-
tics DNS servers’ including, performance, availability, and life-
cycle of servers. They have heuristically analyzed the Alexa’s
top 1-milion list to identify the authoritative DNS deployment
patterns in web domains. Their results show that most of the
emerging popular social websites host the authoritative DNSes
in upstream services that provide performance advantages. Fur-
thermore, they observed that backup and redundant deployment
in hybrid patterns provide availability; revealing the growth of
cloud providing DNS hosting services. Herzberg et al. [9] have
studied DNS-amplification DoS attacks, and have proposed a
defense system that is compatible with common DNS servers
configurations and DNSSEC. The have shown the efficiency
and high performance of the presented DNS-authentication method
in preventing DNS-based amplification DoS attacks. They have
also predicted the adoption of their design, based on game the-
ory algorithms, concluding that their design will sufficiently re-
duce DNS amplification DoS attacks. Additionally, their pro-
posed method can be deployed as a cloud-based service, that
can reduced cost and upgrade defenses for DNS servers.
Discussion. Cloud services are increasingly popular due to
their affordability [154]. However, they are also subject to DoS
attacks, where clients are at risk due to poorly written programs.
Clients of shared hosting providers share IP address with other
clients, which means that blocking one IP results in blocking
all the users. Therefore, the security of cloud services is critical
and should be well established.
5.4. Client
Although, much knowledge about DNS infrastructure has
been derived from aggregate population of clients’ behavior
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analysis, researchers have also emphasized on individual client’s
interaction with DNS ecosystem [67, 36, 55, 171, 35, 174, 173].
For example, Schomp et al. [174] have analyzed the behavior of
individual DNS users in order to develop an analytical model of
their interaction with the DNS ecosystem. They observed that
different types of users behave uniquely with DNS. In addition,
they have demonstrated that the combination of the Weibull and
Pareto can successfully model the process of client query ar-
rival. Finally, they observed the existence of a fairly stable and
unique working set of names for each client.
Pan et al. [171] have proposed a novel client classifica-
tion method based on client query entropy and global recursive
DNS service architecture. By monitoring the query frequen-
cies of the clients, they have validated the effectiveness of the
proposed method on busy and long-tailed clients. They have
found that 2.32% clients can cover the most important web
spiders, recursive servers, and well-known internet services.
Greschbach et al. [173] have investigated the impact of DNS
traffic on Tor clients’ vulnerability to correlation attacks and
how DNS lookups can be utilized for information stealth.
Kuhrer et al. [36] have highlighted the vulnerabilities in
DNS resolvers by analyzing the changes in their landscape, and
the response authenticity of the resolvers from the users’ per-
spective. They observed that a large number of resolvers inten-
tionally manipulate resolutions for malicious activities.
Khan et al. [67] have measured the harm caused to the users
by quantitatively measuring the time wasted by typosquatting.
They have introduced a new metric that offers several advan-
tages such as empirical quantification of harm to the clients,
identification of typosquatting domain names, and proportion
of different typosquatting perpetrators. They have analyzed a
large scale DNS dataset (active and passive), and noticed that
the typosquatting events affect both the users and the websites.
Their analysis confirms that typosquatting increases both the
time taken by the client to find the intended website, and the
latency between a typo and its correction.
Luo et al. [55] have analyzed ISP network traces to un-
derstand various approaches of the attackers towards the ex-
ploitation of DNS for malicious activities. They have taken a
variety of syntactic as well as temporal patterns into account
to propose a method that identifies different clusters of mali-
cious domain names that lead to DNS failures. Based on their
evolutionary learning framework, less suspicious clusters were
removed while highly suspicious cases were preserved. Their
proposed framework analyzes DNS failures on per-client basis
and in practice, they have used their framework on a large-scale
ISP network trace to find that over 97% of the users with suspi-
cious DNS activities can be detected with 81% precision.
Discussion. Clients are usually the main target in cyber crimes,
and they suffer from a wide variety of attacks including phish-
ing attacks, DNS manipulation, cybersquatting, etc. Existing
research in the literature has analyzed the impact of threats on
the clients, however, it remains an open challenge to extend the
literature for user-intention-based anomaly detection method to
identify anomalous DNS traffic.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, a comprehensive study have been conducted
to review the ecosystem of DNS from various points of view.
Therefore, a large number of peer reviewed and recently pub-
lished research works have been surveyed and then potential
vulnerabilities of DNS security and corresponding countermea-
sures have been summarized. In addition, we have looked into
the research works from two different point of view, namely
data analysis methods and DNS entities landscape. In DNS re-
search methods, we have looked into the literature to under-
stand the limitations as well as strengths of utilized data anal-
ysis methods which would offer valuable guideline to analyze
the existing challenges in DNS ecosystem. The second, DNS
entities scope, looks into the role of different entities in DNS
infrastructure and points out common vulnerabilities and lim-
itations of existing components of the DNS ecology. Further-
more, in each sub-section we have discussed the challenges and
pointed out open research directions.
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